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ABSTRACT 
Elise L. Rice: Positive spontaneous thoughts reflect incentive salience 
(Under the direction of Barbara L. Fredrickson) 
 
 Despite the abundance of research on unwanted intrusive thoughts, positive spontaneous 
thoughts have been the subject of very little prior research. The present work aimed to evaluate 
the role of positive spontaneous thoughts in motivation by exploring their relationship with 
incentive salience – a property that energizes wanting and approach motivation by rendering 
cues that are associated with reward more likely to stand out to the individual when encountered 
in the environment (Berridge, 2007). I reasoned that positive spontaneous thoughts may be 
concomitants of incentive salience, and as such, they may mediate the effect of liking on 
wanting. The three studies discussed in Chapter 2 tested that hypothesis using a variety of 
measures and methods and revealed that positive spontaneous thoughts do indeed mediate the 
relationship between liking something and wanting it. Given that positive spontaneous thoughts 
were related to wanting as predicted, I explored whether they may play an active role in 
energizing wanting rather than merely co-occurring with incentive salience. The experiment 
discussed in Chapter 3 provided a preliminary answer to that question; participants who believed 
that their spontaneous thoughts about a target activity were especially positive planned to engage 
in that activity more often over the coming week than participants who had no such perception 
about their spontaneous thoughts. Collectively, these studies demonstrate an important role of 
positive spontaneous thoughts in shaping approach motivation. Broader implications and future 
directions in the study of positive spontaneous thoughts are discussed. 
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CHAPTER 1: A DIFFERENT KIND OF POSITIVE THINKING 
Introduction 
 Human life is characterized by rich and complex mental experiences. A variegated web 
of thoughts permeates daily life as memories, ideas, and observations weave in and out of 
conscious awareness. However, recurring patterns in the way psychologists have approached 
research on different forms of thought fail to capture this variability, instead painting an 
undeservedly bleak picture of the experience and consequences of many forms of thoughts. This 
is not to say that demonstrations of the ways in which thoughts can be toxic have been 
exaggerated, just that the conversation lacks adequate balance by virtue of a longstanding focus 
on identifying potential detriments rather than benefits arising from various kinds of thoughts. 
 Much of this imbalance comes from the abundance of research in clinical psychology, 
which historically has been dominated by a disease model of mental illness. Important work 
spanning decades in this field has thoroughly documented how cognitive phenomena such as 
unwanted intrusive thoughts and rumination are prominent features of multiple 
psychopathologies, including depression, anxiety disorders, obsessive-compulsive disorder, and 
post-traumatic stress disorder. As a result, the scientific community has amassed an extensive 
record of the numerous ways in which the mere act of thinking can go wrong. For example, 
studies using a variety of methods have linked rumination with higher levels of depressive 
symptoms (Nolen-Hoeksema & Harrell, 2002), onset of new depressive episodes (Nolen-
Hoeksema, 2000), and prolonged duration of depressive episodes, (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991). 
Further, a common theme of obsessive-compulsion disorder seems to be the attribution of 
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exaggerated significance to recurrent, obsessive thoughts (Freeston et al., 1997; Purdon & Clark, 
1993; Rachman, 1997). And in a sample of cancer patients who were not diagnosed with any 
particular mental illness (although other work has noted the presence of PTSD among cancer 
survivors; Cordova et al., 1995), intrusive thoughts about cancer were strongly related to 
psychological distress (Baider & De-Nour, 1997).  
Given that “negative thinking” is at the core of so much mental illness, it would seem 
obvious that “positive thinking” could be an important ingredient for well-being. While lay 
theories persist in support of this idea, empirical research on the efficacy of positive thinking 
(which admittedly is a very broad term that has been operationalized in many different ways) has 
not been particularly encouraging. Instead, there are many instances in which positive thinking 
seems to backfire if it does anything at all. In such cases, mood repair becomes an extra burden 
on top of the original source of distress, and the effect of realizing how far one is from the goal 
state (i.e., disappointment) is directly contrary to the goal state itself (i.e., happiness). For 
example, participants with low self-esteem felt worse after repeating positive statements about 
themselves than participants who did no such task (Wood, Perunovic, & Lee, 2009). And 
excessively valuing happiness, which might be cause for positive thinking, has been linked with 
less positive affect (Mauss, Tamir, Anderson, & Savino, 2011) and greater loneliness (Mauss et 
al., 2012).  
Beyond the context of mood repair, positive thinking has also been considered a possible 
tool for motivation, although again, empirical research has not supported this perspective. 
Whereas fantasizing about the future is associated with fewer depressive symptoms when 
measured at the same time point, fantasizing actually predicts more depressive symptoms over 
time (Oettingen, Mayer, & Portnow, 2016). Likewise, fantasizing (sometimes simply referred to 
3 
as positive thinking, though detachment from reality seems to be the key ingredient) has also 
been found to derail goal pursuit unless followed by contemplation of the present reality 
(Oettingen, 2012). In one especially provocative demonstration, archival analyses revealed that 
positive and future-oriented content in newspaper articles and presidential inaugural addresses 
predicted declines in the strength of the economy (Sevincer, Wagner, Kalvelage, & Oettingen, 
2014). 
Even thoughts as seemingly mundane and inconsequential as those that occur during 
mind-wandering have been cast as predictors of discontent. In an impressive experience-
sampling study of over 2000 people, participants reported that they were less happy during 
episodes of mind-wandering than when focused on the task at hand, regardless of what that task 
was (Killingsworth & Gilbert, 2010). Importantly, time-lagged analyses revealed that mind-
wandering generally preceded unhappiness. These findings led the authors to boldly conclude 
that “a human mind is a wandering mind, and a wandering mind is an unhappy mind” (p. 932). 
Other research also suggests that perhaps the typical entertainment value of thoughts is not very 
high: in one study, a quarter of female participants and two thirds of male participants chose to 
receive a mild electrical shock rather than sit uninterrupted with their thoughts for 15 minutes 
(Wilson et al., 2014). 
Positive Spontaneous Thoughts 
 But surely there is more to the story. It seems to be the case that questions about how 
thoughts can contribute to positive well-being are simply underexplored. Certainly some work – 
such as research on optimism – implies that positive cognitions can be beneficial, although the 
bulk of that evidence comes from research on optimism as an individual difference rather than 
the actual thoughts that may be characteristic of it (Scheier & Carver, 1993). To begin filling that 
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gap by focusing on the thoughts themselves, I have developed a program of research on positive 
spontaneous thoughts, which may be conceptualized as the pleasant counterparts to intrusive 
thoughts. By definition, positive spontaneous thoughts are positively valenced cognitions that 
arise without the conscious experience of effort or intention. Importantly, this framework places 
no restrictions on content; positive spontaneous thoughts may take the form of memories, 
daydreams, or observations. A positive spontaneous thought may be completely irrelevant to 
whatever task a person is engaged in at the moment it arises (the defining feature of mind-
wandering), or it may directly pertain to that task. Regardless of topic, these thoughts are 
experienced as positively valenced and simply seem to pop into one’s mind. 
There are at least two broad reasons why positive spontaneous thoughts may be less 
susceptible to the pitfalls that often derail their deliberate counterparts, and both of them relate to 
the automaticity by which positive spontaneous thoughts arise. On the one hand, the absence of 
conscious control in producing positive spontaneous thoughts should leave them relatively 
unfettered by misguided goals and lay theories, such as excessively valuing happiness. It would 
seem that a large part of the issue with deliberate positive thoughts intended to improve mood is 
that in their desire to feel better, people may go about thinking the wrong way. While I am not 
aware of existing data to speak to differences in spontaneous thoughts as a function of valuing 
happiness, I expect that most spontaneous thoughts in daily life arise primarily as a result of 
heightened mental accessibility and would be largely incidental to matters of valuing happiness. 
If anything, one might predict that valuing happiness would facilitate maladaptive techniques for 
pursuing happiness (such as positive deliberate thinking), which may get in the way or more 
organic process that normally unfold without effort, such as positive spontaneous thoughts.    
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 Further, the fact that by definition, positive spontaneous thoughts arise without effort may 
mean that they hold extra promise for mood repair. Given that these thoughts should arise rather 
efficiently, their production should not depend on the availability of psychological resources – 
such as executive functioning or self-esteem – and as such, positive spontaneous thoughts may 
be a powerful tool for people when they need them most. Again, it may be the case that allowing 
positive spontaneous thoughts to operate is as simple as not getting in their way with misguided 
processes that are guided by explicit goals. 
However, despite the potential promise of positive spontaneous thoughts, one might also 
be skeptical of just how much impact they can have. After all, negativity bias – the valence 
asymmetry by which negative emotions exert greater psychological impact than positive 
emotions – has been documented across a wide variety of contexts (e.g., reactions to life events, 
close relationships, learning, memory, etc.; Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001), 
and it almost certainly applies in the case of spontaneous thoughts. In fact, negativity bias may 
be at least partly responsible for the imbalance of scientific attention granted to intrusive 
thoughts rather than their pleasant counterparts over decades of psychological research. 
Although positive spontaneous thoughts are likely not felt as intensely as their negative 
counterparts, they may have substantial import in other ways. In particular, positivity offset is 
another widely documented valence asymmetry, which refers to the tendency for most mentally 
healthy people to experience more positive emotions than negative emotions in their daily lives 
(Catalino & Fredrickson, 2011; Diener, Kanazawa, Suh, & Oishi, 2015; Fredrickson, 2013). 
Indeed, whereas negative emotions are generally felt acutely in the moment and narrow attention 
to focus on responding to a problem, positive emotions operate in a different way entirely. 
Positive emotions are typically felt less intensely in the moment and broaden attention and 
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cognitive processing, so that as they accumulate over time, they enable people to build 
biological, psychological, and social resources (Fredrickson, 1998, 2001, 2013). It seems 
reasonable to expect the thoughts that are colored by positive and negative emotions to adhere to 
roughly the same patterns. Whereas negative intrusive thoughts are felt intensely and may 
narrow the perceiver’s attention to problems and other negative material, positive spontaneous 
thoughts may emerge into conscious awareness more quietly but also more frequently, so that 
their accumulation over time gradually supports beneficial outcomes. 
Other questions about the potential impact of positive spontaneous thoughts may relate to 
their automaticity. Given that spontaneous thoughts are less tethered to conscious awareness than 
relatively deliberate thoughts, particularly in the ways in which they are produced, they may not 
seem well situated to exert much influence. It is conceivable that many positive spontaneous 
thoughts may arise without receiving much attention if they are even noticed at all. However, 
there is extensive evidence that conscious awareness is not necessary for psychological process 
to alter emotions (Berridge & Winkielman, 2003; Winkielman & Berridge, 2004; Winkielman, 
Berridge, & Wilbarger, 2005) or behavior (Bargh, Chen, & Burrows, 1996; Chartrand & Bargh, 
1999). And in fact, several studies revealed that people actually infer more meaning from their 
spontaneous thoughts than relatively deliberate ones (Morewedge, Giblin, & Norton, 2014). 
 Indeed, recent research on positive spontaneous thoughts suggests that they are 
consequential phenomena that deserve further empirical attention (Rice & Fredrickson, 2015, 
2016a, 2016b). Some of the first work to shed light on positive spontaneous thoughts explored 
how they related to people’s favorite activities, or their passions. Passions are a ripe area for 
research on positive spontaneous thoughts because given their significance in people’s lives, the 
mental concepts of passions are likely to possess chronically heightened accessibility, which 
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should render them more likely to pop into conscious awareness at any given time. Likewise, 
because passions are activities that people generally enjoy by definition, thoughts about them 
should tend to be largely positive.  
According to the prevailing theoretical framework in research on passions, people’s 
passions generally possess two types of qualities to varying degrees: more harmonious passions 
are pursued more freely and generally do not conflict with other life domains (e.g., work, 
relationships, etc.; Vallerand et al., 2003). By contrast, more obsessive passions are pursued with 
less autonomy and tend to create conflict with other life domains. Although all passions provide 
enjoyment, more harmonious passions are associated with more intense experiences of positive 
affect while engaged in the activity and after completing the activity, whereas levels of obsessive 
passion tend to be unrelated to positive affect (Vallerand et al., 2003). As such, I hypothesized 
that people would have frequent spontaneous thoughts about their passions, and that harmonious 
passion would predict the positivity of spontaneous thoughts people experienced about the 
passion. Several studies bore out these predictions. First, I found that people did recall 
experiencing an abundance of spontaneous thoughts about their favorite activities, and those 
thoughts tended to be overwhelmingly positive (Rice & Fredrickson, 2016a, 2016b). However, 
there were also measurable differences in the positivity of spontaneous thoughts about passions 
that seemed to correspond to qualities of the passion. That is, more harmonious passions were 
associated with spontaneous thoughts about the activity that were more positive, whereas 
obsessive passion was unrelated to positivity of spontaneous thoughts. Importantly, these effects 
emerged when examined both cross-sectionally and over time.  
Additional work on passions suggests that positive spontaneous thoughts relate not only 
to the experience of passions but also to several indicators of well-being associated with 
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passions. In a cross-sectional sample, positivity of spontaneous thoughts about physical activity 
was associated with greater satisfaction with life, meaning in life, and flourishing, and it was 
negatively correlated with depressive symptoms (Rice & Fredrickson, 2016b). Further, path 
analysis revealed that positivity of spontaneous thoughts mediated the effects of harmonious 
passion on well-being (a latent construct with flourishing, meaning in life, and satisfaction with 
life) and depressive symptoms. 
The Present Research 
Following early findings that positive spontaneous thoughts are measurable, track with 
experienced affect, and can even predict behavior (Rice & Fredrickson, 2016b), the research 
discussed in the following chapters aims to explore the role of positive spontaneous thoughts in 
motivation. To that end, this project draws heavily from research on the fundamental 
psychological mechanisms that govern reward processing and approach motivation. A diverse 
body of research in that domain suggests that liking and wanting are separately guided by 
distinct neurological substrates, and that the two are mediated by a property called incentive 
salience that typically makes objects associated with reward pop out at the perceiver when 
encountered in the environment. The foundation of research on incentive salience comes from 
compelling studies of animal models, but to date, far fewer experiments have evaluated how 
incentive salience operates within the psychology of humans. The research discussed herein aims 
to integrate positive spontaneous thoughts within the framework of incentive salience and test 
their role in energizing wanting and approach motivation. 
Beyond the conceptual framework of incentive-salience theory, the research discussed in 
Chapters 2 and 3 also draws heavily from the upward spiral model of lifestyle change 
(Fredrickson, 2013). The upward spiral model describes how positive emotions may facilitate 
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sustainable behavior change without relying on the limitations of effortful self-control. In 
particular, the upward spiral model posits that experiencing positive emotions during an activity 
(i.e., “liking” an activity) should create incentive salience, rendering cues related to the activity 
more likely to stand out when encountered in the future. Incentive salience should then amplify 
wanting, so the individual is more likely to repeat the activity. All the while, the positive 
emotions one experiences during the activity should accumulate over time to build biological, 
psychological, and social resources that enable the individual to extract even more positive 
emotions from future instances of engaging in the activity. This project constitutes a test of a key 
subset of the upward spiral model from positive emotions to incentive salience (operationalized 
herein as positive spontaneous thoughts) to behavioral wanting. 
 Chapter 2 describes three studies that were designed to evaluate positive spontaneous 
thoughts within the framework of incentive salience. Those studies use correlational and 
experimental methods to determine whether positive spontaneous thoughts occupy the same 
psychological space between liking and wanting as incentive salience. The research described in 
Chapter 3 goes a step further in exploring the relationship between incentive salience and 
positive spontaneous thoughts. Merely establishing a pattern of mediation does not clarify 
whether positive spontaneous thoughts are epiphenomenal to incentive salience, or they play an 
active role in amplifying wanting. The single study described in Chapter 3 uses an experimental 
manipulation to test whether perceptions of positive spontaneous thoughts about an activity alter 
wanting to engage in that activity. Collectively, these four novel studies represent a substantial 
step forward in understanding the role of positive spontaneous thoughts in motivation. 
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CHAPTER 2: POSITIVE SPONTANEOUS THOUGHTS MEDIATE  
THE EFFECT OF LIKING ON WANTING 
Introduction 
Humans are in many ways not unlike Looney Tunes. Though most people’s eyes do not 
literally jump out of their faces when they perceive a delicious meal or other highly desirable 
stimulus, the ways in which they do process rewards are comparable in some respects (although 
bounded by the constraints of facial anatomy). One influential perspective on reward processing 
suggests that liking a stimulus is separable from wanting it, and that the two are mediated by a 
third psychological construct called incentive salience (Berridge, 2007). In more concrete terms, 
experiencing positive emotions during some activity or behavior (i.e., “liking” the activity) may 
imbue that concept and closely associated concepts (e.g., physical objects, people) with incentive 
salience, enhancing the ability of these cues to capture attention in subsequent encounters. That 
heightened salience in turn generates wanting and motivates approach behavior, increasing the 
likelihood that the individual will repeat the behavior in question. The primary purpose of the 
research reported herein is to evaluate positive spontaneous thoughts (i.e., pleasant thoughts that 
arise without the subjective experience of intent) as a specific mechanism by which incentive 
salience operates within this theoretical framework. That is, I predict that enjoying an activity 
will facilitate more positive spontaneous thoughts about that activity (i.e., thoughts popping into 
one’s head instead of eyes popping out of one’s head), and in turn, positive spontaneous thoughts 
will promote approach behavior.  
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Incentive Salience  
 The incentive-salience framework was developed to address the role of dopamine in 
approach motivation (Berridge, 2007). Whereas prior theories struggled to account for findings 
that dopamine manipulations seemed to increase appetitive behavior toward a target stimulus 
with no effect on how well the stimulus was liked, this model separates reward processing into 
three components: liking, wanting, and learning. In particular, incentive-salience theory suggests 
that dopamine facilitates only the wanting component of reward, which is separately guided by 
liking and learning (Berridge, 2007; Smith, Berridge, & Aldridge, 2011). That is, when an 
individual repeatedly encounters a stimulus that is experienced as pleasant (i.e., “liking”), the 
learned associations between that pleasantness and the cues that are predictive of it endow those 
cues with incentive salience, making the object more likely to capture attention in the future. 
That heightened salience in turn prompts dopaminergic wanting and reward-seeking behaviors 
when the individual subsequently encounters the salient cues. Indeed, this framework has 
received strong support in animal models (Cagniard, Balsam, Brunner, & Zhuang, 2005; Peciña, 
Cagniard, Berridge, Aldridge, & Zhuang, 2003; Smith et al., 2011). And in addition, several 
studies have documented compelling evidence for how incentive salience operates in humans. 
First, a rather simple manipulation of effort allowed researchers to disentangle the 
relationship between liking and wanting in humans (Waugh & Gotlib, 2008). In that study, 
individual differences in the degree to which participants enjoyed cartoons were predictive of 
wanting when low levels of effort were required to earn the opportunity to view more cartoons. 
However, it was also clear that the two constructs do not always correspond one to one: when 
participants had to work harder to view more cartoons, the tie between liking and wanting was 
severed.  
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Other research has helped to clarify the salience component of incentive salience by 
showing that positively valenced words are perceived in ways suggestive of heightened approach 
motivation. That is, study participants overestimated the size of the text in which positive words 
were presented as well as the duration of time for which they were displayed, implying that 
positive cues possessed a perceptual emphasis (Ode, Winters, & Robinson, 2012).  
More extreme demonstrations of the incentive salience system at work in humans can be 
found in some cases of drug addiction. In particular, the notable dissociation between liking and 
wanting that occurs as addiction progresses (i.e., liking decreases as wanting increases) is 
consistent with the notion that the neural systems altered in certain addictions mediate incentive 
salience but not pleasure (Robinson & Berridge, 2008).  
Based on this broad pattern of findings, incentive salience may play an important role as 
people try out new behaviors. For example, when a person tries a new exercise class, the extent 
to which he or she experiences positive affect during the class, may engender the concept of that 
class as well as related concepts, such as workout clothes, water bottle, exercise mat, etc., with 
heightened salience. As such, upon encountering any of those cues in the future, they will be 
more likely to capture attention and evoke some urge, however subtle, to attend that class again. 
In light of this framework, there may be multiple ways in which positive spontaneous 
thoughts relate to incentive salience. First, spontaneous thoughts may be indicators of the 
incentive salience attributed to reward cues. If positive emotions endow the mental concept of a 
stimulus with heightened salience, that concept and cues related to it should be more likely to 
emerge into conscious awareness at any given time, and as such, positive spontaneous thoughts 
may be an epiphenomenon of incentive salience: a mere marker without downstream effects.  
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A second possibility, however, is that positive spontaneous thoughts may be active 
ingredients through which incentive salience motivates subsequent reward-seeking behavior. If 
incentive salience promotes positive spontaneous thoughts through heightened accessibility and 
related processes, those thoughts may in turn compound the sense of wanting or lead an 
individual to develop plans for how she will further pursue the object or activity. I favor this 
second possibility, which is consistent with prior research suggesting that mental accessibility 
and positive affect complement one another to motivate goal pursuit (Aarts, Custers, & Marien, 
2008; Custers & Aarts, 2005, 2007). Indeed, a central hypothesis in the current work is that 
positive spontaneous thoughts occupy a key motivational role situated between liking and 
wanting and thereby energize the effect of incentive salience.  
Positive Spontaneous Thoughts 
Several relatively distinct lines of research support the hypothesis that positive 
spontaneous thoughts are a key mechanism through which incentive salience generates appetitive 
behavior. First, recent research on people’s perceptions of their own spontaneous thoughts 
indicates that such thoughts are felt to be more meaningful than their more deliberate 
counterparts (Morewedge et al., 2014). Positive spontaneous thoughts may thus be particularly 
potent drivers of approach behavior. For instance, it seems plausible that repeatedly noticing the 
prominence of a given activity (or person, object, etc.) in one’s mind could spur an individual to 
make specific plans to pursue that activity. In this way, positive spontaneous thoughts may 
operate as small nudges that collectively facilitate behavior. More generally, this view is 
consistent with the basis of self-perception theory, which suggests that people infer their own 
attitudes and other information about themselves by observing their own behavior and in this 
extension, their own thoughts (Bem, 1967, 1972).  
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Second, research on the Zeigarnik effect is also relevant. The Zeigarnik effect refers to 
the heightened presence of unfinished tasks in memory and thoughts (Zeigarnik, 1938) and is 
thought to result when the mind rehearses information that may facilitate the completion of 
ongoing tasks and goals. Strikingly, research on recurrent thoughts has almost exclusively 
fixated on negative variants, such as rumination and intrusive thoughts. Harkening back to 
Zeigarnik, one prominent model of rumination posits that concepts and cues associated with 
unfulfilled goals are granted extra salience, which should result in repeated, unintended thoughts 
related to the goal (Martin & Tesser, 1996). To bridge this domain with the perspective of 
incentive salience, one may consider how in some respect, enjoyed activities that bear the 
promise of future reward may be held in the mind as perpetually unfinished business. In the 
present research, I predicted that the heightened accessibility of concepts bearing incentive 
salience should increase the likelihood that at any given time, these concepts will spontaneously 
seep into conscious awareness.  
Finally, work on the basic mental constructs that support goal pursuit is congruent with 
the current research. Building on prior research on nonconscious goal activation, recent work 
demonstrates that mental concepts that possess a combination of heightened mental accessibility 
and association with positive affect are wanted and pursued most strongly relative to those 
associated with neutral or negative affect (Aarts et al., 2008; Custers & Aarts, 2005, 2007). 
Positive spontaneous thoughts by definition entail both mental accessibility and positive valence, 
and as such, they are well suited to energize wanting and approach behavior. 
Although the processes described above may well apply to thoughts of any affective 
valence, theory and past evidence suggest that pleasant and unpleasant spontaneous thoughts 
may diverge in at least one key domain. To the extent that positive emotions broaden attention 
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(Fredrickson, 1998, 2001, 2013) and promote cognitive processing that is particularly flexible 
and divergent (Estrada, Isen, & Young, 1994; Isen, Daubman, & Nowicki, 1987), it may be that 
positive emotions experienced during an activity – relative to negative emotions – cast a wider 
net of salience onto co-occurring cues. Indeed, this conceptualization offers a new interpretation 
of the robust findings of “less marked cuing effects for negative than for positive affect” (Isen, 
1993, p. 262). Data indicating that positive mood improves people’s ability to detect semantic 
association among groups of words suggest even more directly that this may be the case (Bolte, 
Goschke, & Kuhl, 2003). Though one might expect the avoidance-oriented salience created by 
negative emotions to be especially intense (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001), 
its cue-driven repellant effect appears to have a narrower foothold.  
The Present Research 
 Although very little prior research has directly addressed the motivational functions of 
positive spontaneous thoughts, several existing findings directly relate to the present research. 
For example, one investigation of the spontaneous thoughts people have about their favorite 
activities (i.e., their passions) found that the qualities of passions that are most associated with 
positive emotions predicted positivity of spontaneous thoughts about the passion (Rice & 
Fredrickson, 2016b). This effect is consistent with the hypothesis that liking an activity should 
cultivate positive spontaneous thoughts about it. 
Further, one prior investigation has explored the motivational functions of positive 
spontaneous thoughts (Rice & Fredrickson, 2015). Although it yielded results consistent with the 
current predictions, limitations of the study design preclude inferences about causality. In that 
cross-sectional study of 232 mid-life adults sampled at baseline of the larger study reported 
herein as Study 3, reports of more intense positive emotions during physical activity were 
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associated with the positivity of spontaneous thoughts about physical activity, and the positivity 
of those spontaneous thoughts was in turn related to more frequent physical activity. 
Bootstrapping analyses revealed a significant indirect effect of positive emotions on activity 
frequency through positivity of spontaneous thoughts. Importantly, no similar effects emerged 
for the mere frequency of spontaneous thoughts, regardless of affective valence.  
The present research was designed to extend these findings into a variety of contexts and 
evaluate the larger theoretical model with the added rigor of experimental control. Specifically, 
Study 1 tests the predicted mediation model across a diverse array of behavioral contexts that 
extend beyond physical activity. Study 2 incorporates a manipulation of liking to test the causal 
effect of positive emotions on subsequent spontaneous thoughts as well as the hypothesized 
downstream impact on behavioral indicators of wanting. Finally, Study 3 tests the full mediation 
model from liking to wanting through spontaneous thoughts using time-lagged measures over the 
span of 10 weeks and allows for another manipulation of positive emotions, this time delivered 
through meditation training. 
Study 1 
The primary purpose of Study 1 was to test whether people tend to have more positive 
spontaneous thoughts about activities they enjoy, and whether those thoughts in turn predict 
differences in wanting across a variety of contexts. To those ends, I asked participants to rate 
multiple activities in terms of how much they enjoyed them during the previous week and how 
positive their typical spontaneous thoughts about those activities were in the previous 24 hours. 
Participants also reported on how much they wanted to engage in each activity in the following 
24 hours. Further, participants reported on how much control they felt they typically had over 
whether and when to enact the activity (to further disentangle obligation from more autonomous 
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wanting) as well as how frequently they actually did engage in the behavior. Based on my 
overarching hypothesis that positive spontaneous thoughts mediate the relationship between 
liking an activity and wanting to do that activity, I predicted that participants would report more 
positive spontaneous thoughts about activities that were more well-liked, and in turn, positivity 
of spontaneous thoughts would predict wanting, above and beyond obligation and frequency of 
actual behavior. 
Methods 
Participants 
 The study sample included 103 adult MTurk workers living in the United States. The 
sample was fairly balanced in terms of gender (52.4% male), and participants predominantly 
identified as White or Caucasian, although other ethnicities were represented (1.9% American 
Indian or Alaska Native, 6.8% Asian, 4.9% Black or African American, 83.5% White or 
Caucasian, 2.9% Other). Participants ranged in age from 19 to 65, and the mean age was 35.73 
(SD = 11.60). Participants were compensated $0.25 for completing the brief online questionnaire. 
Procedure 
 Participants who provided informed consent completed the study by reporting on 
different aspects of target activities. Ten activities were randomly drawn from a list of common 
daily activities gathered from multiple sources including the American Time Use Survey and the 
Day Reconstruction Method (Kahneman, Krueger, Schkade, Schwarz, & Stone, 2004). The final 
list of target activities included exercising or being physically active, eating a nutritious meal, 
commuting, learning something new, socializing, running errands, relaxing, doing chores, 
purchasing consumer goods, and caring for household members. 
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 First, participants read a description of spontaneous thoughts (below) and then estimated 
how many times they noticed having a spontaneous thought about each activity in the past 24 
hours. Then, for activities that had been the subject of at least one spontaneous thought, they 
rated how positive and negative those thoughts were on separate 10-point scales that ranged from 
“Not at all” to “Extremely.” In answering the valence items, participants were asked to consider 
how positive and negative their recent thoughts about each activity had been on average. 
“Take a moment to reflect on the spontaneous thoughts you have about each activity 
listed below. Sometimes, you might deliberately think about a given activity - maybe 
cooking, if you are trying to remember a recipe - but other times, you might find yourself 
thinking about that activity without meaning to - perhaps because excited thoughts about 
an upcoming meal just keep coming to mind. Here, we are especially interested in that 
second kind of thought - the kind that you have without trying. Sometimes spontaneous 
thoughts might seem to just pop into your head, or other times you might catch yourself 
thinking about something without remembering why you started. Sometimes these 
thoughts are pleasant, and other times they are unpleasant.” 
 
 Next, participants reported on the positive and negative emotions they experienced during 
each activity in the week before the previous day. Specifically, participants responded to items 
asking to what extent they experienced positive and negative emotions during the target 
activities, using separate 7-point scales that ranged from “Not at all” to “Extremely.” Participants 
were also able to select a “Not applicable” option if they had not engaged in a given activity in 
the specified time period. 
 In the next section, participants reported how much they wanted to do each activity. The 
instructions specifically asked respondents to consider wanting strictly in terms of what they felt, 
regardless of practical issues like scheduling constraints. 
 Last, participants reported in the same manner on several other factors including how 
much autonomy versus obligation they generally felt in deciding whether and when to engage in 
each activity, how recently they last engaged in each activity, how soon they planned to engage 
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in each activity next, and how often they generally engaged in each activity. After completing 
these items, they provided demographic information and read a debriefing statement that 
explained the purpose of the study and the primary hypotheses. 
Analytic Strategy 
 All analyses were conducted using SAS 9.3. Given the nested structure of the data (i.e., 
multiple activities rated by each participant), I used multilevel modeling to test the predicted 
associations among liking, positive spontaneous thoughts, and wanting. More specifically, I first 
tested whether liking predicted positivity of spontaneous thoughts and parsed between- and 
within-person effects by including both the person-mean centered values and the mean-centered 
person means as predictors. I then tested whether positivity of spontaneous thoughts predicted 
wanting using an analogous model. Both models included a random intercept and a random slope 
for the key predictor variable. To test my prediction that positive spontaneous thoughts mediate 
the relationship between liking an activity and wanting to engage in it, I analyzed a lower-level 
(1-1-1) mediation model using the selection-variable approach (Bauer, Preacher, & Gil, 2006) to 
estimate the entire model simultaneously. In follow-up analyses, I tested the specificity of the 
predicted effects to positive affect by evaluating analogous processes both in the context of 
negative affect and in terms of spontaneous thought frequency, regardless of valence. 
Results 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Although participants were allowed to opt out of responding to items that were not 
applicable (e.g., if they never did a particular activity), missing data accounted for less than 6% 
of cases on most variables. If participants reported not having any spontaneous thoughts about a 
given activity in the past 24 hours, they were not asked follow-up questions about thought 
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valence, so these variables have higher rates of missingness (positivity = 14.76%; negativity = 
18.35%). See Tables 1 and 2 for more detailed information on missing data and descriptive 
statistics. 
Primary Results 
First, I tested whether positive emotions experienced during an activity predicted 
positivity of spontaneous thoughts about that activity by analyzing a multilevel model with a 
random intercept and random slope. As predicted, there was a significant within-person effect of 
liking on the positivity of spontaneous thoughts; see Table 3 for all parameter estimates. This 
effect indicates that activities associated with more positive emotions were the subject of more 
positive spontaneous thoughts relative to other activities reported on by the same individual. 
Further, the analogous between-person effect was also significant, indicating that participants 
who experienced more positive emotions across activities reported spontaneous thoughts that 
were more positive than participants who experienced lower levels of positive emotions.  
Next, I tested whether positivity of spontaneous thoughts predicted subsequent levels of 
wanting by testing a multilevel model, also with a random intercept and slope. As predicted, 
there was a significant within-person effect of positive spontaneous thoughts on wanting, even 
when autonomy and frequency of behavior were included in the model as covariates. This effect 
indicates that activities that were the topic of more positive spontaneous thoughts were wanted 
more in the coming 24 hours than other activities reported on by the same participant. Further, 
the analogous between-person effect was also significant, which indicates that participants who 
experienced more positive spontaneous thoughts across activities reported greater levels of 
wanting than participants who experienced spontaneous thoughts that were less positive. 
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Positivity of spontaneous thoughts also predicted how soon participants planned to do a given 
activity next, although in this model, only the within-person effect was significant.  
To test my hypothesis that positivity of spontaneous thoughts would mediate the 
relationship between liking and wanting, I used Bauer et al.'s (2006) method for simultaneously 
estimating the paths of a 1-1-1 multilevel model. The total effects1 of liking on positivity of 
spontaneous thoughts and of positivity of spontaneous thoughts on wanting were both 
significant, which is consistent with the significant within- and between-person effects from 
earlier analyses. Further, the direct effect of liking on wanting was significant as well (β = 0.553, 
SE = 0.052, t(85.7) = 10.60, p < .001, 95% CI = [0.449, 0.656]). Subsequent bootstrapping 
analysis with 10,000 draws revealed that the average indirect effect of liking on wanting through 
spontaneous thoughts was indeed significant (estimate of = 0.260, SE = 0.046, p < .001, 95% CI 
= [0.169, 0.351]). 
Specificity Analyses 
 Given that the planned analyses were consistent with my hypotheses, I pursued follow-up 
analyses to determine whether the observed effects were specific to positive spontaneous 
thoughts or whether they reflected more general phenomena that applied regardless of valence. 
As such, I first removed positivity from the model and tested whether the mere frequency of 
spontaneous thoughts about an activity – positive or negative – predicted subsequent levels of 
wanting to engage in that activity above and beyond obligation and the frequency with which the 
activity is typically completed. This analysis revealed a significant within-person effect, such 
that participants reported greater levels of wanting to do activities about which they had more 
frequent spontaneous thoughts, regardless of the valence of those thoughts. However, the 
                                                          
1 Because the within- and between-person effects were all significant in preliminary models, I did not test those 
effects separately in the mediation model. 
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between-person effect was not significant. To further explore processes related to spontaneous-
thought frequency, I tested a model in which positive emotions and negative emotions during an 
activity both predicted thought frequency. Interestingly, only the within-person effect of positive 
emotions was significant, which means that participants had more frequent spontaneous thoughts 
about activities they enjoyed more intensely.  
 Next, I tested whether negativity of spontaneous thoughts was related to wanting, 
controlling for obligation and frequency of behavior. This analysis revealed a significant within-
person effect, such that activities that were the topic of more negative spontaneous thoughts were 
wanted less than other activities reported on by the same participant. The corresponding 
between-person effect was not significant. To further explore the relationship between valenced 
spontaneous thoughts about an activity and wanting, I created a new model with positivity of 
spontaneous thoughts and negativity of spontaneous thoughts as simultaneous predictors and 
autonomy and frequency of behavior included as additional covariates. This analysis revealed 
robust effects of positive spontaneous thoughts on wanting both within and between participants. 
By contrast, only the within-person (and not the between-person) effect of negative spontaneous 
thoughts on wanting was significant, and it was of a relatively lower magnitude that the 
analogous within-person effect for positive spontaneous thoughts. 
Discussion 
 The results of Study 1 are consistent with the predicted model wherein positive 
spontaneous thoughts mediate the relationship between liking an activity in the past and 
subsequently wanting to engage in it. That is, consistent with my hypothesis that liking generates 
positive spontaneous thoughts about a target, I found that activities that were enjoyed to a greater 
degree were associated with spontaneous thoughts that were more positive. Likewise, I found 
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that activities that were the topic of more positive spontaneous thoughts were wanted in the 
coming 24 hours to a greater degree, which is consistent with my hypothesis that positive 
spontaneous thoughts energize wanting. Finally, the overarching indirect effect of liking on 
wanting through positive spontaneous thoughts was also significant.  
Follow-up analyses suggested that while these processes are not entirely specific to 
positive affect (which would have been an unusual outcome – surely negativity has some bearing 
on reducing approach motivation), the relationship between positive spontaneous thoughts and 
wanting may be stronger than that of their negative counterparts. Interestingly, whereas positive 
emotions during an activity predicted subsequent spontaneous-thought frequency, there was no 
relationship between negative emotions and spontaneous-thought frequency. This finding is 
consistent with the prediction that enjoyment may cast a wider net of salience onto related cues 
than displeasure, which may narrow attention.  
Ultimately, these data support the hypothesis that positive spontaneous thoughts mediate 
the relationship between liking and wanting across a wide array of behavioral contexts. Of 
course, these data are self-reported, largely retrospective, and correlational, thus allowing no 
inferences about causality. Study 2 was designed to test the same hypotheses by measuring 
actual spontaneous thoughts in real time in an experimental design that permits causal inference. 
Study 2 
The primary purpose of Study 2 was to test whether liking an activity causes increases in 
the positivity of subsequent spontaneous thoughts about that activity. To these ends, I 
manipulated the degree of positive affect participants experienced while viewing a series of 
cartoons by systematically altering the captions of some cartoons to be intentionally humorless. 
Then, I measured the positivity of subsequent spontaneous thoughts about the cartoons as well as 
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how much effort participants were willing to expend to view more cartoons of a similar type. 
Following the hypothesis that liking an activity generates positive spontaneous thoughts about 
that activity and related cues, I predicted that participants who viewed the funnier cartoons 
would subsequently report spontaneous thoughts about those cartoons that were more positive 
than participants who viewed the less amusing cartoons. Further, participants who viewed the 
funnier cartoons should demonstrate greater willingness to expend effort for the opportunity to 
view more cartoons of a similar type. Overall, I also predicted that positivity of spontaneous 
thoughts about the activity would mediate the relationship between liking (i.e., experimental 
condition) and wanting (i.e., effortful behavior). This study also presents an opportunity to 
compare positive spontaneous thoughts with a previously validated measure of incentive salience 
(Ode et al., 2012). As such, I predicted that positivity of spontaneous thoughts about cartoons 
would be correlated with participants’ judgments about the size of the text in which the word 
“cartoon” was displayed. 
Methods 
Participants 
The study sample included 99 undergraduates enrolled in Introductory Psychology at the 
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. The sample was predominantly female (71.43%), 
and the majority of participants identified as White or Caucasian, although other ethnicities were 
represented (i.e., 15.31% Asian, 8.16% Black or African American, 74.49% White or Caucasian, 
2.04% Other). Participants ranged in age from 17 to 24, and the mean age was 18.71 (SD = 1.04). 
Participants earned partial course credit by completing the lab-based experiment. 
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Procedure 
 Participants who provided informed consent were randomly assigned to one of two 
conditions before beginning the study procedure, which was largely adapted from earlier 
research (Sherdell, Waugh, & Gotlib, 2012; Waugh & Gotlib, 2008). In the first section of the 
study, participants completed 10 trials that involved simultaneously viewing one cartoon from 
each of two decks (labeled “LUM” or “GUP”; labels were counterbalanced) and indicating how 
much they preferred one cartoon or the other using a 7-point response scale that ranged from 
“Strongly prefer the left cartoon” to “Strongly prefer the right cartoon.” In the “funny” condition, 
all of the cartoons in one deck were funny, and all of the cartoons in the other were not funny; 
that is, their original humorous captions had been replaced by dry statements that merely 
described the action portrayed. In the “mixed” condition, the makeup of the humorless deck 
remained the same, but half of the cartoons in the other deck were altered (by removing the 
captions or replacing them with dry, descriptive captions) so that they were comparable to those 
in the humorless deck. To summarize, all participants viewed one deck that was entirely 
humorless, and the other deck was composed of either only amusing cartoons (“funny” 
condition) or a mix of amusing and humorless cartoons (“mixed condition”). The primary 
purpose of this comparison task was to allow participants to learn that one deck was full of 
humorless cartoons, whereas the cartoons in the other tended to be more amusing, but to varying 
degrees across the two experimental conditions. 
 In the next section, participants viewed the same 20 cartoons that had appeared in the 
preference task one by one and rated how much they enjoyed each when it first appeared. These 
ratings provided an index of liking and were thus used as a manipulation check to ensure that 
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participants in the funny condition found the cartoons in the targeted deck to be more amusing 
than participants in the mixed condition. 
 Next, participants completed a thought-listing task that lasted three minutes. In this task, 
participants were asked to clear their minds and let them wander and to write down a keyword or 
brief phrase that described every distinct thought they had during the allotted time. Immediately 
after reporting a thought, participants were be asked to indicate how spontaneous it felt using a 
5-point response scale ranging from “Not at all” to “Completely.” After rating the thought, 
participants were instructed to clear their minds again and continue the thought-listing task as 
before. After the three minutes elapsed, participants were asked to respond to two follow-up 
questions about each thought they reported. Specifically, they were asked to indicate how 
positive each thought felt (5-point scale, “Not at all” to “Completely”) and to complete a binary 
measure indicating whether each thought pertained to the cartoons from earlier in the study. 
Next, participants completed a click-count task previously used as a behavioral measure 
of wanting (Sherdell et al., 2012; Waugh & Gotlib, 2008). In each of the 36 trials in this task, 
participants were given the choice to view a cartoon from the LUM or GUP deck, but each deck 
was associated with a variable cost, such that they had to click on a moving black square a 
certain number of times to earn the opportunity to view a cartoon from each deck. The values 
associated with each deck were determined by an algorithm that adjusted the click costs across 
trials (both in terms of absolute values for each deck and relative differences between them) to 
determine two indifference points. One indifference point corresponded to how many times 
participants were willing to click for the funnier deck when the unfunny deck was anchored at 0 
(i.e., no effort). A second indifference point corresponded to the analogous value when the 
unfunny deck was anchored at 15 clicks (i.e., some effort). For example, when the unfunny deck 
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was anchored at 0, perhaps a participant would consistently opt for the funny deck when it cost 
5, 10, or 15 clicks, but when it cost 20 clicks or above, his choices would become more random. 
In this way, the algorithm scored how much extra effort participants were willing to exert to earn 
a cartoon from the funnier deck over a cartoon from the unfunny deck. In several cases where 
participants’ responses were too random, the algorithm was not able to determine an indifference 
point within the 36 trials included in the study. See Table 4 for sample sizes across conditions. 
In the next phase of the study, participants completed a font-size estimation task that has 
previously been used to measure incentive salience (Ode et al., 2012). In this task, participants 
completed multiple trials that involved comparing target words to a vertical array of the letter 
“Z” presented along the far left side of the screen in increasing font sizes. Their task was to 
quickly estimate the size of the font in which the stimulus word was presented, using the array of 
letters as a reference. Stimuli included words normed as somewhat positive (e.g., melody) or 
neutral (e.g., paper) as well as the target word, “cartoon.” 
Last, participants provided demographic information and read a debriefing statement that 
described the hypotheses and the purpose of the study. 
Analytic Strategy  
All analyses were conducted using SAS 9.3. First, to validate positive spontaneous 
thoughts against a previously validated measure of incentive salience, I compared patterns of 
spontaneous thoughts about the cartoons to responses on the font-estimation task. Specifically, I 
computed bivariate correlations to test the association between the font-size estimate of the target 
word (i.e., “cartoon”) and frequency of spontaneous thoughts about the cartoons (i.e., a ratio of 
spontaneous thoughts about the cartoons to total thoughts) as well as the average positivity of 
spontaneous thoughts about the cartoons. 
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To evaluate my primary hypotheses, I first used simple linear regression analyses to test 
whether participants assigned to the funny condition experienced spontaneous thoughts about the 
cartoons that were more positive than those reported by participants in the mixed condition. 
Then, I used a similar approach to test whether positivity of spontaneous thoughts predicted 
indifference points in the click-count task – the behavioral index of wanting. To the extent that 
those effects emerged as hypothesized, I planned to use a bootstrapping procedure in Mplus 7.11 
(Muthén & Muthén, 2004) to test the indirect effect of condition on wanting (i.e., click counts 
coded as in Waugh & Gotlib, 2008) through positivity of spontaneous thoughts. 
Results 
Descriptive Statistics 
 See Table 4 for descriptive statistics for key variables. 
Manipulation Check 
 To determine whether participants in the funny condition liked the cards in the amusing 
deck more than participants in the mixed condition, I aggregated the individual liking ratings (in 
pixels) for those cards into an average liking score for each participant. I then submitted these 
scores to a simple linear regression analysis in which condition was a dummy-coded predictor 
variable, which revealed a significant difference in liking across conditions (β = 155.164, SE = 
36.038, t(1) = 4.31, p < .001, 95% CI = [83.638, 226.689]). As expected, participants in the 
funny condition reported that they liked the cartoons in the amusing deck more than participants 
in the mixed condition. 
Validation Analyses 
First, I sought to determine whether positive spontaneous thoughts about cartoons 
corresponded to a previously validated measure of incentive salience. Before testing the 
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predicted association, I analyzed participants’ estimates of positive and neutral words, to 
determine whether the effect found in previous research replicated in the current sample. A 
paired-sample t-test revealed that participants estimated positively valenced words (M = 4.585, 
SD = 3.819) to be larger than neutral words (M = 3.462, SD = 3.186), t(105) = 3.63, p < .001, 
95% CI = [0.509, 1.737]. Given that the task appeared to operate as intended, I computed the 
bivariate correlation between participants’ font-size estimates for the word “cartoon” and the 
positivity of their spontaneous thoughts about the cartoons. The correlation was positive, 
although it escaped statistical significance (r = 0.239, p = .052). It is worth noting that when all 
thoughts about the cartoons (regardless of spontaneity) were included, thought positivity was 
unrelated to size estimates (r = 0.152, p = .179). Likewise, frequency of spontaneous thoughts 
was also unrelated to size estimates (r = -0.010, p = .925). Finally, font-size estimates did not 
differ by experimental condition (β = 0.165, SE = 0.264 t = 0.63, p = .533, 95% CI = [-0.358, 
0.688]). 
Primary Analyses 
 To determine whether the click-cost task operated as expected, I tested whether 
indifference points differed as a function of condition. Consistent with prior research (Waugh & 
Gotlib, 2008), participants in the funny condition were willing to work harder than participants in 
the mixed condition when the unfunny deck was anchored at 15 (β = 6.571, SE = 2.370, t = 2.77, 
p = .007, 95% CI = [1.855, 11.287]). The analogous effect when the unfunny deck was anchored 
at 0 merely approached significance (β = 5.209, SE = 2.873, t = 1.81, p = .074, 95% CI = [-0.511, 
10.931]). However, the means were in the predicted direction: participants in the funny condition 
exerted more effort than participants in the mixed condition.  
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To test whether the manipulation altered the positivity of participants’ spontaneous 
thoughts about the cartoons, I submitted those scores to a simple linear regression analysis with 
condition predicting positivity of spontaneous thoughts. Consistent with my hypothesis, there 
was a significant effect of condition (β = 0.932, SE = 0.243, t = 3.83, p < .001), 95% CI = [0.447, 
1.418]), such that participants in the funny condition reported spontaneous thoughts about the 
cartoons that were more positive than those reported by participants in the mixed condition. 
 Likewise, I tested whether the manipulation altered the frequency of participants’ 
spontaneous thoughts about the cartoons to examine the specificity of the effect to positive 
spontaneous thoughts. After excluding thoughts that were not rated as at least moderately 
spontaneous, I computed a ratio for each participant corresponding to the number of thoughts 
about the cartoons relative to total number of thoughts reported. Then, I submitted these ratios to 
a simple linear regression analysis with experimental condition as a binary predictor. This 
analysis revealed that there was no effect of condition on frequency of spontaneous thoughts 
about the cartoons (β = 0.030, SE = 0.052, t = 0.58, p = .566, 95% CI = [-0.073, 0.133]).  
 Last, I tested whether the positivity of participants’ spontaneous thoughts about the 
cartoons predicted their behavior in the click-cost task. To that end, I first submitted the 
indifference points when the unfunny deck was anchored at 0 clicks to a simple linear regression 
analysis with positivity of spontaneous thoughts about the cartoons as the predictor variable. The 
results of this analysis suggest that there was no association between the positivity of 
participants’ spontaneous thoughts about the cartoons and subsequent effort they exerted to earn 
funny cartoons (β = -0.046, SE = 1.485 t = -0.03, p = .976, 95% CI = [-3.025, 2.934]). I repeated 
the same kind of analysis using the indifference points when the unfunny deck was anchored at 
15 clicks, and this model also yielded null results (β = 1.066, SE = 1.132, t = 0.94, p = .350, 95% 
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CI = [-1.201, 3.333]). Frequency of spontaneous thoughts about the cartoons was also unrelated 
to effort when the unfunny deck was anchored at 0 clicks (β = -4.768, SE = 5.781 t = -0.82, p = 
.412, 95% CI = [-16.284, 6.748]) and 15 clicks (β = -2.232, SE = 4.922 t = -0.45, p = .652, 95% 
CI = [-12.032, 7.567]). Because there was no relationship between positivity of spontaneous 
thoughts and indifference points, I did not pursue the planned mediation analysis. 
Discussion 
 Study 2 extended the findings of Study 1 by testing the causal links between liking and 
positive spontaneous thoughts in an experimental context. Consistent with my hypothesis that 
liking generates positive spontaneous thoughts about a target, participants assigned to the funny 
condition reported spontaneous thoughts about the cartoons they viewed that were more positive 
than participants assigned to the mixed condition. This effect enables greater confidence in the 
causal relationship between liking and positive spontaneous thoughts. Further, it is notable that 
this result is based on actual thought data reported in real time as opposed to global estimates 
made retrospectively by participants. There was no such effect of condition on frequency of 
spontaneous thoughts about the cartoons. 
 Study 2 also provided an opportunity to compare patterns of positive spontaneous 
thoughts to a previously validated indicator of incentive salience based on estimating the size of 
a target word. Consistent with my overarching hypothesis that positive spontaneous thoughts 
reflect incentive salience, average positivity of spontaneous thoughts about the cartoons showed 
a modest association with font-size estimations in the predicted direction. That is, participants 
who had more positive spontaneous thoughts about the cartoons they had viewed tended to 
overestimate the size of the word “cartoon” to a greater degree. Granted, the estimate scores 
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were based on a single trial and may not be as reliable as aggregate scores that have been used in 
prior research. 
Although I predicted that positivity of spontaneous thoughts would be associated with 
greater willingness to work to view funny cartoons (i.e., higher indifference points in the click-
count task), this effect did not emerge. One explanation for the null effect of thoughts on effort 
might have been that the click-count task simply did not operate in this sample as expected. 
However, that does not seem to have been the case given that participants in the funny condition 
were generally willing to work more to view the cartoons – which they reported enjoying more – 
than participants in the mixed condition.  
An alternative explanation may be that the effect of positive spontaneous thoughts on 
wanting for a particular stimulus is forged over a longer time period than the three minutes 
allotted in the procedure. For example, it may be necessary for participants to detect sustained 
patterns within their spontaneous thoughts, and if that is the case, such mental computations (or 
merely impressions) may require more mental “data” than can be acquired in a few minutes. Or 
if spontaneous thoughts can exert direct influence on wanting in the absence of conscious 
perception, perhaps they simply need more time to accumulate. Explanations concerning time 
might seem more plausible if it were not for the effect of condition on behavior, which suggests 
that the path from liking to wanting did indeed unfold within the timeframe of the study 
procedure. In this brief evaluation at least, the data can’t rule out that positive spontaneous 
thoughts are epiphenomenal to incentive salience, rather than active ingredients by which it 
produces wanting. Still, it may be that positive spontaneous thoughts operate over a longer term 
to supplement basic connections among liking, incentive salience, and wanting. Study 3 provides 
an opportunity to explore that possibility. 
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Study 3 
 Study 3 builds on the previous studies by testing the full mediation model of liking to 
wanting through positive spontaneous thoughts in a longitudinal, experimental design. In 
particular, this study will test three questions. Does liking an activity increase the positivity of 
spontaneous thoughts about that activity over time? And does spontaneous-thought positivity 
promote more frequent instances of behavior? Ultimately, do positive spontaneous thoughts 
mediate the relationship between liking and wanting?  
In Study 3, I explored these questions within the framework of the upward spiral model 
of lifestyle change (Fredrickson, 2013), which outlines how positive emotions may promote the 
integration of wellness behaviors in people’s daily lives. That is, to the extent that positive 
emotions endow activities and associated cues with incentive salience (which should spark 
positive spontaneous thoughts), people should subsequently want to engage in those behaviors 
more. In turn, the more they engage in those behaviors, the more likely they are to continue 
experiencing positive emotions during them in a self-reinforcing cycle. Concurrently, as positive 
emotions broaden mindsets, they may also build resources over the long term, some of which 
may increase the positive-emotion yield of wellness behaviors down the road, such that the 
aforementioned cycle becomes amplified. In Study 3, meditation training was selected to deliver 
the positive-emotion intervention, given that prior research has documented an increase in daily 
positive emotions among individuals who practice loving-kindness meditation relative to 
individuals who practice mindfulness meditation (Fredrickson et al., unpublished data). 
Measures of positive emotions, spontaneous thoughts, and various behaviors related to physical 
health and well-being (e.g., meditation, physical activity, eating fruits and vegetables) were 
collected before, during, and after meditation training. I predicted that participants randomly 
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assigned to the loving-kindness condition would show increases in positive emotions during 
meditation (and throughout their day, more generally) that should predict increases in the 
positivity of subsequent spontaneous thoughts about meditation. Those thoughts should in turn 
predict increases in how frequently participants practiced meditation.  
Methods 
Participants 
 The study sample includes 226 adults from the Chapel Hill community enrolled in a 
study on wellness behaviors. The majority of participants identified as female (61.06%) and 
White or Caucasian, although other ethnicities were represented (i.e., 0.44% American Indian or 
Native Alaskan, 4.87% Asian, 17.26% Black or African American, 77.43% White or Caucasian). 
Ages ranged from 34 to 65 (M = 48.513, SD = 8.887). Participants received monetary 
compensation for completing the study. 
Procedure 
 In the first week of the study, participants completed a baseline lab visit, which involved 
providing biological samples and completing a variety of measures unrelated to the main themes 
of this project. During the next two weeks, participants completed daily, weekly, and biweekly 
questionnaires. Daily questionnaires included a dichotomous item asking whether participants 
had meditated in the past 24 hours.2 If participants indicated having meditated, follow-up items 
prompted them to report on how positive they felt while meditating. One set of questionnaires 
administered every other week included an event-reconstruction task that guided participants 
through recalling the last time they meditated. In the course of this task, participants reported on 
their emotions during the activity, intentions to change their behavior, and the frequency and 
                                                          
2 Analogous data were also collected for other key health-related behaviors (i.e., physical activity. eating fruits and 
vegetables, smoking, and alcohol use). 
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positivity of spontaneous thoughts they generally had about the activity. All questionnaires also 
contained other measures not directly related to the present research. 
 In weeks four through nine, participants attended a weekly meditation class (loving-
kindness or mindfulness meditation, depending on the condition to which they were randomly 
assigned at the beginning of the experiment), which was led by an expert instructor and lasted 
about an hour. Classes in both conditions broadly aimed to cultivate open and nonjudgmental 
attitudes, though instructions for directing one’s attention varied notably between groups. The 
loving-kindness training directed practitioners to focus their attention on various social targets 
(i.e., a loved one, oneself, an acquaintance, a difficult person, and all beings) and on physical 
sensations in the chest. The mindfulness training directed practitioners to focus their attention 
toward different elements of conscious experience (i.e., breathing and hearing, the body, 
emotions, thoughts, and choiceless awareness). Daily and biweekly questionnaires continued 
during this phase of the procedure. 
 For the three weeks after the meditation classes (i.e., weeks ten through twelve), 
participants continued to complete the usual series of daily and biweekly questionnaires. Last, 
participants returned to the lab during the thirteenth week of the procedure.  
Analytic Strategy 
 All analyses were conducted using SAS 9.3 and primary hypotheses were tested using 
multilevel modeling, given the nested nature of the data (i.e., repeated observations within 
individuals). As a first step, I analyzed three separate models to test the effect of condition on all 
three key variables: positive emotions during meditation3, positive spontaneous thoughts about 
                                                          
3 Note that no previous research has demonstrated differences in positive emotions during loving-kindness 
meditation versus mindfulness meditation. This predicted effect is based on the possibility that increases in daily 
positive emotions associated with lovingkindness meditation practice (which have been noted in previous research) 
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meditation, and frequency of meditation behavior. Then, I planned to test a 2-1-1 mediation 
model to evaluate the indirect effect of condition on change in behavior through change in 
positive spontaneous thoughts. To these ends, I aggregated the daily measures of behavior and 
positive emotions into two-week blocks, so that they corresponded to the biweekly time scale on 
which spontaneous thoughts were measured. My primary analyses were designed to test whether 
condition predicted positivity of spontaneous thoughts about meditation in a given time block 
above and beyond positivity of spontaneous thoughts measured in the preceding time block and 
whether positivity of spontaneous thoughts predicted increases in meditation behavior above and 
beyond behavior measured in the preceding time block.  
Results 
 To lay the groundwork for my primary analyses, I tested the effects of condition on 
positive emotions during meditation, positivity of spontaneous thoughts about meditation, and 
frequency of meditation behavior. First, I created a multilevel model with condition and average 
positive emotions during meditation at time T (e.g., Block 1) predicting average positive 
emotions during meditation at time T+1 (e.g., Block 2). This analysis revealed that condition did 
not predict changes in positive emotions during meditation over time; see Table 5 for parameter 
estimates. Likewise, there was no effect of condition on changes in positivity of spontaneous 
thoughts about meditation, nor was there an effect of condition on changes in meditation 
behavior when those variables were evaluated in analogous time-lagged models. Simpler 
multilevel models with condition predicting mean levels of each variable without regard for time 
also revealed no differences. 
                                                          
will be manifest during meditation behavior as well as throughout the day, so that there may be differences in 
positive emotions during meditation across the two conditions. 
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 After the planned analyses based on condition did not turn out as predicted, I created 
models that tested the effects of measured positive emotions during meditation (rather than 
condition) on positive spontaneous thoughts about meditation and in turn, on meditation 
behavior. First, I found that average positive emotions during meditation predicted increases in 
positivity of spontaneous thoughts about meditation over the next two-week block; see Table 5 
for parameter estimates. Likewise, average positive emotions during meditation also predicted 
increases in frequency of spontaneous thoughts about meditation. Although spontaneous-thought 
frequency actually approach significance in predicting less frequent meditation behavior, there 
was no effect of positivity of spontaneous thoughts on change in behavior. 
 Next, I explored the same analyses in the context of physical activity; whereas meditation 
was a new activity for all participants, physical activity in some form was probably quite familiar 
to most of them. As with the meditation data, condition did not predict changes in positive 
emotions during physical activity, positivity of spontaneous thoughts about physical activity, or 
frequency of physical activity, nor were there differences in the mean levels of any of those 
variables based on condition. See Table 6 for parameter estimates. 
However, treating positive emotions during physical activity as a measured rather than 
manipulated variable was again more fruitful. Positive emotions during physical activity 
predicted increases in positivity of spontaneous thoughts – but not frequency of spontaneous 
thoughts in general – about physical activity; see Table 6 for parameter estimates. Further, 
positivity of spontaneous thoughts about physical activity predicted increases in frequency of 
physical activity and average duration of cardiovascular activity. Finally, frequency of 
spontaneous thoughts (regardless of valence) also predicted changes in both measures of 
behavior. 
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Discussion 
 Study 3 provided a controlled test of how the predicted pathway from liking to behavior 
through positive spontaneous thoughts proceeds over several weeks. Although the manipulation 
of positive emotions does not appear to have altered positive emotions during the target activities 
based on the present analyses, the richness of the densely repeated measures within this 
longitudinal dataset afforded a compelling evaluation of several key hypotheses nonetheless. 
Interestingly, the pattern of results depended somewhat on the activity in question. While 
analyses of the meditation data revealed that experiencing positive emotions during meditation 
predicted subsequent increases in the frequency and positivity of spontaneous thoughts about 
meditation, positivity of spontaneous thoughts was unrelated to subsequent changes in frequency 
of meditation behavior. This pattern is similar to the findings from Study 2, in which the 
manipulation of liking produced changes in the positivity of spontaneous thoughts about the 
cartoons, but positivity of spontaneous thoughts did not predict wanting behavior. However, both 
pieces of the path emerged as significant in the case of physical activity. Experiencing positive 
emotions during physical activity predicted subsequent increases in the frequency and positivity 
of spontaneous thoughts about physical activity, and the positivity of those thoughts predicted 
increases in frequency and duration of behavior.  
Although it is unclear why the effect of positive spontaneous thoughts on wanting held 
for physical activity but not meditation, one explanation may pertain to the nature of the larger 
study. In this experiment, meditation training was chosen as the means for delivering the 
manipulation of daily positive emotions, and as such, participants’ decisions to meditate may 
have been complicated by a sense of adherence to the study procedures rather than merely driven 
by wanting. However, the results of Study 1 suggested that positive spontaneous thoughts may 
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relate to wanting above and beyond obligation. Alternatively, the null effect of positive 
spontaneous thoughts on wanting to meditate could also be related to the novelty of meditation 
for participants in the sample.  
General Discussion 
 The primary aim of the present research was to evaluate a possible role of positive 
spontaneous thoughts in motivation. Study 1 extended prior correlational work by testing the 
associations among liking, wanting, and spontaneous thoughts in a variety of contexts. Study 2 
provided evidence for the causal effect of liking on positive spontaneous thoughts, and Study 3 
provided additional evidence for the model by which liking predicts positive spontaneous 
thoughts and in turn wanting in a more extensive longitudinal framework. Collectively, these 
studies largely support my overarching hypothesis that positive spontaneous thoughts represent a 
key mechanism through which incentive salience facilitates wanting and approach behavior.  
However, important questions remain. Although the main purpose of Study 2 was to test 
the effect of positive emotions on positive spontaneous thoughts in an experimental context, it 
also provided an opportunity to explore the effect of positive spontaneous thoughts on a 
behavioral index of wanting. This test produced null results, so the greater pattern of findings 
does not rule out the possibility that positive spontaneous thoughts are mere indicators of 
incentive salience. Further, although the results Study 3 were consistent with the hypothesized 
model in the context of physical activity, there was no effect of positive spontaneous thoughts 
about meditation on changes in the frequency with which participants practiced meditation. 
Future research should explore boundary conditions – such as novelty of the activity in question 
– to explain this pattern of effects. 
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 Perhaps the most substantial limitation of the present research is the absence of a direct 
manipulation of positive spontaneous thoughts. Given the very nature of spontaneous thoughts, 
developing manipulations to increase their prevalence is difficult, sometimes necessitating 
designs that evalute indirect effects involving some preceding variable (in the case of the present 
studies, positive emotions). Direct manipulations of positive spontaneous thoughts may not be 
impossible, however. One workaround may involve preventing rather generating thoughts, akin 
to how manipulations of facial feedback have used props to prevent the activation of muscles 
involved in smiling (Strack, Martin, & Stepper, 1988) or have taken advantage of facial paralysis 
in individuals who had received Botox injections (Neal & Chartrand, 2011). Future research 
might involve asking some participants to focus on a distractor topic, which may impede the 
occurrence of spontaneous thoughts (Wegner, Schneider, Carter, & White, 1987), and asking 
other participants to mind wander or engage in some other relatively unbounded thought task that 
should allow for positive spontaneous thoughts. Though the measures of spontaneous thoughts 
described herein have been used successfully in prior research (Rice & Fredrickson, 2016), it 
will be extremely valuable to continue to develop novel methods and improve existing ones. 
 One major theoretical implication of this work lies in its potential for extending the 
incentive-salience framework. Though some recent research has documented experiential 
elements of incentive salience in humans (Ode et al., 2012), the vast majority of prior research in 
this area has focused on neurobiological mechanisms in animal models. In contrast, the research 
described herein is designed to identify a distinct psychological mechanism by which incentive 
salience creates wanting: the generation of positive spontaneous thoughts. Relatedly, to the 
extent that positive spontaneous thoughts may be taken as indicators of incentive salience, the 
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current work may also suggest new methodological possibilities for measuring a construct that is 
otherwise rather challenging to operationalize. 
 The present research is all the more important given the shortage of existing work on 
positive spontaneous thoughts. Indeed, a common trend in earlier literature seems to have been 
acknowledging that positive spontaneous thoughts do exist but focusing rationale and 
methodology on their negative counterparts (e.g., Horowitz, 1986; Klinger, 1975; Martin & 
Tesser, 1989, 1996; Rachman, 1981). On the contrary, the primary focus of this work involves 
identifying an important function of these everyday phenomena. Still, much additional work 
needs to be done before positive spontaneous thoughts are on equal footing with related 
phenomena like intrusive thoughts.  
Beyond contributions to basic understanding of motivational processes, this research may 
also inform more applied research on goal pursuit and behavior change. Many of the measures 
and paradigms selected for this project relate to health and wellness contexts, and it is not 
difficult to see the utility of better understanding how to promote desired behavior in these 
domains. In short, this research may suggest an alternative to the long-standing Nike slogan “just 
do it.” Instead, a data-driven alternative may be something more along the lines of “just like it.” 
According to the data presented herein, infusing positive emotions in daily life and especially 
during activities one wishes to up-regulate should generate more of the positive thoughts that pop 
into one’s head and inspire appetitive behavior.   
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CHAPTER 3: PERCEPTIONS OF POSITIVE SPONTANEOUS THOUGHTS  
SHAPE PLANS TO ENGAGE IN PHYSICAL ACTIVITY 
Introduction 
 Recent research on positive spontaneous thoughts (Chapter 2) suggests that they are 
related to incentive salience – a motivational property that energizes wanting and approach 
orientation. However, the nature of that relationship remains unclear. Are positive spontaneous 
thoughts merely indicators of incentive salience, or do they play an active role in altering 
wanting? Incentive salience arises when an activity or object becomes associated with a positive 
experience, and that association with reward lends heightened accessibility to the mental 
representation of the activity or object (Berridge, 2007; Smith et al., 2011). As such, that concept 
(as well as closely related concepts) should be more likely to emerge into conscious awareness, 
either when encountered in the environment or at any given time in the form of spontaneous 
thoughts. However, it remains to be seen whether those thoughts are merely an epiphenomenon 
of incentive salience, or they are an active ingredient in the process by which incentive salience 
amplifies wanting. 
 The present study was designed to follow up on the results of prior research by testing 
whether perceptions of positive spontaneous thoughts are sufficient to cause increases in 
wanting, above and beyond actual thought patterns. One reason that positive spontaneous 
thoughts may be potent primers of appetitive behavior is that people seem to infer more meaning 
from spontaneous thoughts than from their more deliberate or controlled counterparts 
(Morewedge et al., 2014). If people perceive their spontaneous thoughts as nonconscious 
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indicators that they should do something, it may be the case that providing people with feedback 
to suggest that their spontaneous thoughts about a given activity are especially positive may be 
sufficient to make them want to engage in that activity. 
The Present Research 
 To test the effect of perceived positive spontaneous thoughts on wanting, this experiment 
adopted a framework inspired by prior research on post-decision spreading of alternatives (e.g., 
Brehm, 1956). The classic paradigm in that research involves asking participants to rank a series 
of items (such as household products) in order of decreasing desirability and then choose 
between two of the items (often the two rated as fifth or sixth most desirable) to receive as a gift. 
Later, participants are asked to re-rank the items, and the two sets of rankings are analyzed. 
Typically, the chosen item rises in the rankings, whereas the rejected item falls in a subtle mental 
calculus that justifies the prior decision.  
In the present study, participants rated a series of activities in terms of how much they 
wanted to do them, then engaged in thought-listing tasks while facial EMG and cardiovascular 
data were recorded. Findings from the psychophysiological data will be reported elsewhere; for 
the purposes of the present study, the psychophysiological equipment simply served to bolster 
the credibility of the bogus thought profile presented in the feedback condition. In that condition, 
the computer delivered a prefabricated message suggesting that patterns of subtle facial and 
physiological activity during the thought task indicated that the participant likely experienced 
especially positive spontaneous thoughts about one of the activities. Participants in the control 
condition received no such message. Next, participants rated the activities once again, and to the 
extent that perceptions of positive thoughts alter wanting, whichever activity was the subject of 
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the feedback should rise in the ratings, whereas there should be no changes for participants in the 
control group.  
Methods 
Participants 
 The study sample included 74 undergraduates enrolled in Introductory Psychology at the 
University of North Carolina.4 The average age of participants was 19.19 (SD = 2.63), and the 
majority of participants identified as female (71.62%). Although most participants identified as 
White or Caucasian, other ethnicities were represented in the sample (12.33% Asian, 16.44% 
Black or African American, 64.38% White or Caucasian, 6.85% Other). Participants earned 
partial course credit by completing the lab-based experiment.  
Procedure 
 Participants who enrolled in the study via the Psychology Participant Pool Website were 
contacted by email 12-24 hours before the beginning of their lab session. The message included a 
reminder about the scheduled session and asked the participant to complete a brief pre-lab 
questionnaire. After providing electronic consent, participants rated how much they wanted to do 
10 physical activities in the next 24 hours, using a response scale from 0 (Not at all) to 10 
(Extremely). The instructions specifically asked participants to consider their responses strictly 
in terms of how much they wanted to do each activity, regardless of practical constraints like 
other obligations or the availability of necessary equipment. The 10 activities included running, 
hiking, walking, swimming, dancing, playing basketball, cycling, playing soccer, doing yoga, 
and lifting weights. These activities were pre-tested to ensure that they are the kinds of activities 
undergraduates actually do. 
                                                          
4 Because study recruitment proceeded much more slowly than anticipated, data collection was not completed by the 
dissertation reporting deadline. However, any final publication will include the planned sample of 80 participants. 
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 Shortly before the beginning of each lab session, the experimenter accessed the 
prospective participants’ wanting ratings and determined which activity was given the fourth-
highest rating. This selection process was also pre-tested to ensure that the target activity would 
not be consistently given ratings at the very top of the scale (in an attempt to avoid a ceiling 
effect) but would still be something the participant wanted to do at least a little. The 
experimenter then set up the lab-session questionnaire by specifying which of the ten physical 
activities would be the target activity for that participant.5 
When participants arrived for the scheduled lab session, they were provided with a paper 
copy of the same consent form and asked to review it before beginning. If participants failed to 
complete the pre-lab questionnaire, they completed the pre-test wanting ratings at the beginning 
of the lab session, and the experimenter surreptitiously used those ratings to determine which 
activity would be the target activity and set up the electronic questionnaire accordingly. Then, 
the experimenter explained to the participant how she would affix the physiological sensors (i.e, 
two ECG sensors on opposite sides of the lower torso, a ground sensor on the back of the left 
hand, a respiration band around the upper torso, a finger-pulse sensor on the middle finger of the 
left hand, two sensors placed above the left eyebrow to measure activity of the corrugator 
supercili, two sensors placed below the outer corner of the left eye to measure activity of the 
orbicularis oculi, and two sensors placed in the middle of the left cheek to measure activity of the 
zygomaticus major). Once all the sensors were in place, they were connected to the recording 
equipment (James Long Company, Caroga Lake, NY), and the experimenter visually examined 
sensor output using Snap-Master data acquisition software (HEM Data Corporation, Southfield, 
MI) to ensure that the signals were calibrated and recording properly.  
                                                          
5 Each of the ten activities were selected as the target activity for at least one participant. Running, walking, and 
dancing were selected as the target activity most often, each for 11 participants. 
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 Next, participants began the computerized section of the experiment. In the first step, 
they completed a three-minute task that involved viewing neutral pictures of plants to allow for 
baseline physiology recording. Then, they completed a one-minute task that involved vividly 
imagining doing the target activity (i.e., the one that had been given the fourth highest rating on 
the pre-test wanting questionnaire).  
Next, participants completed a three-minute thought-listing task. During that time, they 
were instructed to clear their minds and let them wander, pausing only when they had a thought 
to type a keyword or phrase about that thought in a text box on the screen. Immediately after 
listing a thought in that way, participants were asked to rate how spontaneous versus deliberate 
the thought felt (using a 5-point response scale ranging from “Not at all spontaneous” to 
“Completely spontaneous”) and then return to letting their minds wander. After the thought-
listing phase was completed, participants were asked follow-up questions about each of the 
thoughts they reported when prompted with the text they provided. Specifically, participants 
were asked to rate how positive and negative each thought felt as well as whether it pertained to 
the target activity they imagined doing earlier in the study.  
 Next, participants who had been randomly assigned to the feedback condition viewed a 
“thought profile” (see Appendix A) that included the false feedback. The message explained that 
the participant’s physiological responses and thought data collectively suggested that their 
spontaneous thoughts about the target activity were likely to be especially positive and was 
accompanied by a simple graph designed to support the text. Participants assigned to the no-
feedback condition moved to the next section without receiving any feedback. 
 In the next section, all participants completed a second thought-listing task (this one only 
one minute long) and then rated the second set of thoughts they reported. Then, they once again 
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rated how much they wanted to do each of the ten activities and reported their plans to engage in 
each by indicating whether they intended to do each activity in the morning, afternoon, or 
evening of each of the following seven days. They then used those planned schedules to estimate 
how many total hours they would devote to each activity in the coming week. Finally, all 
participants completed several scales unrelated to the primary themes of the present study. 
 After participants completed the computerized tasks, the experimenter removed all 
physiological sensors and recorded the participants’ height and weight. Then, the experimenter 
asked the participant several questions as part of a funneled debriefing procedure designed to 
detect suspicion of the false feedback or whether the participant had guessed the hypotheses or 
the purpose of the study. Finally, the experimenter read a debriefing statement to the participant 
that explained the purpose and hypotheses of the study. 
Analytic Strategy 
 All analyses were conducted using SAS 9.3. To test the hypothesis that the bogus 
feedback altered wanting to pursue the target activity, I submitted the wanting scores for the 
target activities to a repeated-measures ANOVA with condition (feedback, no feedback) as a 
between-subjects factor and ranking (pre-test, post-test) as a within-subjects factor. Similarly, I 
conducted another test of the hypothesis that perceptions of positive spontaneous thoughts 
amplify wanting by analyzing the data on participants’ behavioral intentions. As such, I 
submitted total number of times each participant intended to engage in the target activity over the 
following week and the total duration of those planned instances to separate simple linear 
regression analyses with condition as a dummy-coded predictor variable.  
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Results 
Descriptive Statistics 
 See Table 7 for descriptive statistics pertaining to key variables. 
Suspicion Check 
 None of the participants in the feedback condition suspected that the message was 
prefabricated, although five questioned its accuracy. Excluding those participants from the 
analyses does not alter the pattern of results. 
Primary Analyses 
 To test whether participants’ wanting ratings were influenced by their perceptions of 
positive spontaneous thoughts, I submitted pre- and post-test wanting ratings to a repeated-
measures ANOVA with condition as a between-subjects factor. This analysis revealed that the 
interaction of time and condition was not significant, F(1, 70) = 0.184, p = 0.813, nor was the 
main effect of condition significant, F(1, 70) = 0.09, p  = 0.768. However, there was a significant 
main effect of time, F(1, 70) = 5.70, p = 0.020, such that participants wanted to do the target 
activity less when completing the post-test measure than when completing the pre-lab 
questionnaire. 
 To test whether perceptions of positive spontaneous thoughts altered participants’ 
intentions to engage in the target activity, I first created a variable corresponding to the number 
of times participants intended to engage in the target activity in the following week based on the 
schedules they completed. Then, I submitted those scores to a simple linear regression analysis 
following a Poisson distribution (given the count nature of the outcome variable) with condition 
as a dummy-coded predictor variable. This analysis revealed a significant effect of condition on 
behavioral intentions (β = 0.322, SE = 0.123, p = .009, 95% CI = [0.082, 0.563]), such that 
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participants who received the bogus feedback intended to engage in the target activity more 
frequently in the coming week than participants in the control condition. As another index of 
intentions, I submitted participants’ log-transformed estimates6 of how long they planned to 
engage in the target activity over the following week to a simple linear regression analysis with 
condition as a dummy coded predictor. This analysis revealed no significant effect of condition 
on behavioral intentions (β = 0.130, SE = 0.097, t = 1.34, p = .189, 95% CI = [-0.067, 0.327]).  
Discussion 
 In the present study, I explored the process by which positive spontaneous thoughts may 
drive appetitive behavior, specifically testing whether mere perceptions of thoughts may energize 
wanting regardless of actual thought patterns. Although self-reported wanting was not affected 
by the manipulation, the data suggest that merely believing that one’s spontaneous thoughts 
about a particular activity are especially positive is sufficient to alter the number of times one 
plans to engage in that activity in the coming week.  
The theoretical model at the heart of this endeavor suggests that positive spontaneous 
thoughts should amplify wanting and motivate appetitive behavior, but it was not clear whether 
this step proceeds nonconsciously or whether some conscious awareness and possibly even 
active contemplation of one’s own thoughts contribute to the effects on behavior. My primary 
prediction was that participants who believed their thoughts about a target activity were 
especially positive would demonstrate increases in wanting and plan to engage in that activity 
more than participants who held no such belief regardless of what their actual thoughts are like, 
suggesting that meta-cognitive evaluations may play some role in driving behavior. Though there 
was no change in subjective wanting, participants who received the false feedback reported that 
                                                          
6 Raw data exhibited substantial positive skewness (1.736), but the log-transformed data exhibited very little 
skewness (-0.160). 
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they intended to engage in the target activity more often in the coming week than participants in 
the control condition. Future research may seek to identify similar mechanisms by which this 
process may occur in more ecologically valid contexts. For example, if perceptions (accurate or 
not) of one’s thoughts about an activity can alter behavior, could contemplating positive 
spontaneous thoughts as they arise in daily life have a similar effect? 
 This study also begins to address the question of how positive spontaneous thoughts are 
related to incentive salience. It may be that positive spontaneous thoughts are simply 
epiphenomenal to incentive salience; they are amusing or interesting at most, but they are little 
more than side effects with no actual effect on behavior. On the other hand, positive spontaneous 
thoughts may be an active mechanism through which incentive salience facilitates appetitive 
behavior. Whereas prior research had not convincingly demonstrated a causal effect of positive 
spontaneous thoughts on behavior (Chapter 2), the results of the present study suggest that they 
may indeed cultivate approach motivation, at least at the level of behavioral intentions. 
 Although this study represents a promising step toward understanding how positive 
spontaneous thoughts may facilitate appetitive behavior, important questions linger. First, the 
current research only goes as far as intentions, and it is not clear whether the differences apparent 
at that stage correspond to changes in actual behavior. Second, this experiment explores how 
perceptions of positive spontaneous thoughts – rather than positive spontaneous thoughts 
themselves – may influence approach motivation. On the one hand, this design may offer some 
insight about how conscious awareness and perception may be involved in the effect of positive 
spontaneous thoughts on wanting. However, it also sidesteps the direct question of how positive 
spontaneous thoughts themselves may influence wanting, which remains to be tested in an 
experimental paradigm.   
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 Although prior research provided correlational evidence that positive spontaneous 
thoughts may promote approach behavior (Chapter 2), the current study is the first to test the 
effect of such thoughts on wanting in an experimental context. The present data indicate that 
believing that one’s spontaneous thoughts about a given activity are especially positive shapes 
intentions to engage in that activity such that people actually plan to do the activity more often in 
the coming week. This research suggests that rather than merely arising as incidental features of 
incentive salience, positive spontaneous thoughts may play an active role in energizing wanting. 
  
52 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 4: MORE FOOD FOR THOUGHT(S) 
The research discussed in the preceding chapters represents the first steps toward 
understanding how positive spontaneous thoughts are involved in the psychological processes 
that govern motivation. The studies described in Chapter 2 collectively support the hypothesis 
that positive spontaneous thoughts mediate the relationship between liking and wanting. The 
results of those studies provide compelling evidence that positive spontaneous thoughts could at 
least be considered indicators of incentive salience, but it remained to be seen whether they 
exerted a causal effect on approach motivation. The experiment described in Chapter 3 provided 
an answer to that open question. In that simple study, participants who were led to believe that 
their spontaneous thoughts about a given activity were especially positive intended to engage in 
that activity more often over the following week than participants who did not consider the 
positivity of their spontaneous thoughts. This finding suggests that perceptions of positive 
spontaneous thoughts influence approach motivation and potentially behavior, which is just one 
pathway by which positive spontaneous thoughts themselves may energize wanting. Ultimately, 
this project merges new theorizing about positive spontaneous thoughts with prior research on 
incentive salience. Although some forms of positive thinking can be detrimental to goal pursuit 
(Oettingen, 2012), positive spontaneous thoughts may play an important role in cultivating 
sustainable behavior change. 
 Looking forward, additional research should address the shortcomings of the research 
discussed herein. In particular, Studies 2 and 3 from Chapter 2 present several important 
opportunities for follow-up work. Although both of those studies provided at least some support 
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for the hypotheses they were designed to test, the evidence they produced was not 
overwhelmingly convincing. In Study 2, positivity of spontaneous thoughts did not predict 
performance on the click-cost task, which served as a behavioral index of wanting. In Study 3, 
data concerning physical activity supported the primary hypotheses, but there was no effect of 
positive spontaneous thoughts about meditation on change in meditation behavior. Novelty may 
be a common factor across these two null findings. By design, meditation was a novel activity 
for participants enrolled in Study 3 (at least at the start of the study), and although participants in 
Study 2 had almost certainly all seen cartoons before, it may be the case that they don’t often 
pass their time by viewing series of cartoons. Future studies may explore whether novelty 
represents a boundary condition to the mediating effect of liking on wanting. 
 Other work on positive spontaneous thoughts and motivation may further explore the 
effect of those thoughts on wanting and approach behavior. The experiment described in Chapter 
3 represents an important first step in this line of understanding, although in manipulating 
perceptions of positive spontaneous thoughts, it provides only an indirect answer to the question 
of whether positive spontaneous thoughts themselves actively alter wanting. Subsequent 
experiments should aim to manipulate actual positive spontaneous thoughts – perhaps by 
inhibiting versus allowing them – and should include measures of actual behavior rather than 
mere intentions. 
In addition to further work in the domain of motivation, subsequent research should 
explore other functions of positive spontaneous thoughts, especially those that bear on well-
being. For example, future research may explore whether patterns of positive spontaneous 
thoughts track with individual differences such as flourishing, which represents positive mental 
health – not simply the mere absence of mental illness – and has been compellingly linked with a 
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range of desirable outcomes (Keyes, 2002, 2005a, 2005b). Despite the abundance of research 
documenting the benefits of flourishing, little is known about the cognitive experiences that 
characterize it. To the extent that unwanted intrusive thoughts perpetuate and intensify mental 
illness, it may be the case that positive spontaneous thoughts about others, activities, and even 
one’s self are an important ingredient of mental health. Other work has documented how 
chronically happy people process their experiences differently than people who are less satisfied 
(Lyubomirsky, 2001), and positive spontaneous thoughts may be yet another cognitive factor that 
supports well-being. 
One particularly fruitful avenue for exploring how positive spontaneous thoughts could 
promote optimal states like flourishing may involve considering a recently validated construct: 
prioritizing positivity, which is related to flourishing (Catalino, Algoe, & Fredrickson, 2014). 
Prioritizing positivity has been conceptualized as an individual difference that refers to the extent 
to which people organize their daily lives based on the propensity of various activities to yield 
positive emotions. People who prioritize positivity tend to endorse statements such as “I look for 
and nurture my positive emotions” and “I structure my day to maximize happiness.” Further, 
prioritizing positivity is related to greater levels of positive emotions in daily life, greater overall 
life satisfaction, greater levels of self-compassion, and more positive relations with others, as 
well as lower levels of negative emotions in daily life and fewer depressive symptoms.  
While it seems clear that prioritizing positivity is a largely adaptive construct, much less 
is known about the specific mechanisms by which it operates. Although the items included in the 
prioritizing positivity scale largely seem to imply deliberate processes (e.g., “What I decide to do 
with my time outside of work is influenced by how much I might experience positive 
emotions”), there are almost certainly more automatic processes at play that support the same 
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behaviors. On the one hand, to the extent that this is indeed a reasonably stable trait variable, 
people likely engage in the same positivity-seeking activities repeatedly, and so they may 
develop into habits over time. Given the evidence reported in Chapters 2 and 3 that positive 
spontaneous thoughts support the repetition of previously enjoyed activities, it may be 
worthwhile to explore differences in positive spontaneous thoughts – or perhaps responses to 
them – as a function of prioritizing positivity. 
Other work may explore the role of positive spontaneous thoughts in regulating emotions 
through means beyond situation selection. Though early research in the domain of emotion 
regulation was dominated by a focus on consciously controlled strategies for altering mood 
(especially dampening negative mood), more recent work has considered how many of the same 
processes may – and likely do – unfold automatically (Mauss, Bunge, & Gross, 2007). Positive 
spontaneous thoughts may represent one such example of automatic emotion regulation. In fact, 
positive spontaneous thoughts theoretically entail automatic attentional deployment, given that 
by definition they involve spontaneously tuning one’s attention to pleasant topics, which is the 
ultimate goal of attentional deployment. Future work may seek to evaluate the effectiveness of 
positive spontaneous thoughts in the context of mood repair and identify individual differences 
that predict propensity to experience positive spontaneous thoughts during challenging 
circumstances. 
To the extent that positive spontaneous thoughts can serve as agents of emotion 
regulation, it would be valuable to understand how they may be deployed strategically, perhaps 
using implementation intentions. Implementation intentions are if-then statements that operate by 
creating an association between an opportunity to enact a desired behavior and the behavior itself 
(Gollwitzer, 1993, 1999). Research on implementation intentions has documented their 
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impressive effectiveness across a wide variety of domains (Gollwitzer & Sheeran, 2006), and 
given that they operate by harnessing automaticity, they may provide a uniquely direct answer to 
the question of how to promote positive spontaneous thoughts.  
The research described in Chapter 2 (especially Study 2) suggests that one way to 
cultivate positive spontaneous thoughts is to alter processes upstream, such as experiences of 
positive emotions. However, it may be possible to prepare positive spontaneous thoughts by 
strategically creating implementation intentions. For example, one might create an 
implementation intention to think about a recent experience of gratitude if they are feeling sad. 
This kind of plan could potentially be particularly useful for individuals who tend to respond to 
such episodes in less adaptive ways, such as engaging in rumination. Indeed this may be an 
answer to prior research showing that although positive distractors are effective in combatting 
rumination, depressed samples often encounter difficulty in identifying such distractors in the 
moment (Wenzlaff, Wegner, & Roper, 1988). 
Other research may explore the ways in which positive spontaneous thoughts diverge 
from their more intentional counterparts. Part of the problem with positive thinking may be that 
the process is actually too cognitive. When people engage in positive thinking as a strategy for 
improving mood, they may fixate too much on the mood itself and too quickly make 
comparisons between their current state (e.g., still unhappy) and the goal state (e.g., happy) and 
upon realizing the discrepancy, add disappointment at their failure to whatever undesirable affect 
they were originally trying to remedy (Carver & Scheier, 1982; Schooler, Ariely, & 
Loewenstein, 2003). These are simply not the conditions under which most emotions – positive 
or negative – typically unfold. Rather, emotions generally involve a complex cascade of 
psychological and biological changes that may be stifled in these cases by the heavy-handed 
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evaluation that characterizes ineffective positive thinking. In contrast, positive spontaneous 
thoughts should arise in ways that are incidental to these kinds of issues (i.e., as a function of the 
heightened accessibility of some concept), and as such, the sparks of positive emotions they 
create may have a greater propensity to permeate the mind and body as affect normally does 
without being choked off by explicit goals pertaining to emotion regulation or ideal affect. 
 Studies of psychophysiological processes at play in positive spontaneous thoughts may 
yield helpful insights into whether and why they help regulate mood when deliberate positive 
thinking falls short. For example, there may be simple differences in the extent to which 
spontaneous and deliberate positive thoughts are associated with the physiological concomitants 
of positive affect, such as quickened recovery from the cardiovascular effects of negative 
emotions (Fredrickson & Levenson, 1998; Fredrickson, Mancuso, Branigan, & Tugade, 2000) or 
more simply, smiling. The experiment described in Chapter 3 actually presents one opportunity 
to explore this question. Although the primary purpose of the psychophysiological equipment 
used in that study was to lend credibility to the false feedback presented to participants in the 
experimental condition, experimenters did record cardiovascular and facial EMG data before and 
during the thought-listing task. As such, it will be possible to evaluate for example whether 
expressed smiles relate to patterns of positive spontaneous thoughts. Future research should 
continue to explore how the pleasant thoughts that pop into people’s heads may relate to 
physiological changes in facial musculature and throughout the body. 
 More broadly, the research described herein along with preceding work on positive 
spontaneous thoughts may be seen as occupying a previously desolate space at the intersection of 
positive psychology and automaticity. My sense is that positive psychology has so far largely 
underutilized the rich methods developed to study automatic processes in the tradition of social 
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cognition as well as the vast scientific literature that has accumulated in that area. As one 
example, though bad habits may be more salient than good ones, crafting desirable habits should 
be a relatively straightforward way to promote goal-consistent behavior in a way that sidesteps 
many limitations of effortful self-control and will-power. Research on this broad topic would not 
only contribute to the fields of self-regulation and positive psychology, but it could also inspire a 
wide range of applications.  
Further, other work on positive automaticity may explore how automatic process at play 
in people’s everyday lives support prosocial behavior and social connections. Prior work has 
already documented how nonconscious behavioral mimicry facilitates social affiliation (Lakin & 
Chartrand, 2003; Lakin, Jefferis, Cheng, & Chartrand, 2003) and prosocial behavior (van Baaren, 
Holland, Kawakami, & Knippenberg, 2004), but these demonstrations likely only represent the 
tip of the iceberg. Likewise, other research should evaluate how automatic processes may 
support broader outcomes like meaning in life, life satisfaction, and other indices of well-being. 
As an example, existing research already suggests that accessibility of “true-self” traits is 
positively related to meaning in life (Schlegel, Hicks, Arndt, & King, 2009). While individual 
differences and behaviors should continue to receive empirical attention as predictors of well-
being, future research in the domain of positive psychology should widen its theoretical and 
methodological repertoire to better address how nonconscious processes may contribute to well-
being. 
The research described herein is largely informed by prior work on automaticity and 
social cognition, and it embraces key tenets from those traditions to explore how positive 
spontaneous thoughts are involved in promoting wanting and approach motivations, especially to 
enact the kinds of behaviors that support health and wellness. Collectively, these studies suggest 
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that positive spontaneous thoughts are related to incentive salience at least incidentally – they 
arise following experiences of positive affect and are positively correlated with a previously 
validated measure of incentive salience. Much as incentive salience makes stimuli pop out to the 
individual when encountered in the environment, positive spontaneous thoughts may make 
concepts associated with reward pop into people’s minds regardless of the environment. Further, 
this project provides data to suggest that perceptions of positive spontaneous thoughts about a 
given behavior may even play an active role in shaping intentions to enact that behavior. 
Although the experience of positive spontaneous thoughts may not seem to possess much impact 
at face value, the data presented herein suggest that they play an important role in reward 
processing and may ultimately guide people’s day-to-day behavioral choices.  
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Table 1 
Study 1 Descriptive Statistics 
Variable N Min Max Mean SD 
ST Frequency 1030 0 100 3.296 5.502 
ST Positivity 878 0 10 6.058 2.823 
ST Negativity 841 0 10 2.002 2.775 
Pos. Emotions 970 1 7 4.534 1.729 
Neg. Emotions 975 1 7 2.985 1.820 
Wanting 992 1 7 4.096 2.105 
Autonomy 991 1 7 4.414 1.983 
Last Time 1030 1 6 4.675 1.223 
Next Time 1030 1 7 2.247 1.594 
How Often 1030 1 7 5.545 1.608 
Note: Sample sizes differ across variables because in some cases participants were given the 
option not to report on individual activities if a particular item did not apply. In other cases, as 
with spontaneous thought frequency, if participants did not have any spontaneous thoughts about 
a given activity in the specified time period, they would enter “0” rather than “not applicable.” 
  
     
Table 2 
Study 1 Correlation Matrix 
 Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 ST Frequency -          
2 ST Positivity .12* -         
3 ST Negativity -.03 -.50* -        
4 Positive Emotion .17* .61* -.35* -       
5 Negative Emotion -.01 -.25* .43* -.18* -      
6 Wanting .20* .57* -.35* .67* -.16* -     
7 Autonomy .08* .40* -.27* .52* -.11* .57* -    
8 Last Time .22* .14* -.05 .27* .02 .24* .14* -   
9 Next Time -.19* -.13* .13* -.24* .06 -.26* -.16* -.71* -  
10 How Often .21* .11* -.02 .29* .07* .27* .22* .76* -.79* - 
Note: * p < .05 
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Table 3 
Study 1 Analyses 
Outcome Effects  Estimate SE   t     df p     95% CI 
Positivity 
of STs 
Intercept 5.910 0.129 45.73 101 <.001 5.654, 6.167 
Positive Emotion (W) 1.027 0.069 14.97 766 <.001 0.892, 1.162 
Positive Emotion (B) 1.020 0.145 7.04 101 <.001 0.733, 1.307 
Wanting 
Intercept 1.642 0.260 6.32 101 <.001 1.127, 2.157 
Positivity of STs (W) 0.348 0.032 10.80 757 <.001 0.285, 0.411 
Positivity of STs (B) 0.214 0.051 4.22 101 <.001 0.113, 0.315 
Autonomy of Behavior 0.368 0.030 12.44 747 <.001 0.310, 0.426 
Frequency of Activity 0.171 0.039 4.37 747 <.001 0.094, 0.248 
Time to Next 
Activity 
Intercept 5.587 0.172 32.54 101 <.001 5.246, 5.927 
Positivity of STs (W) -0.043 0.013 -3.39 773 <.001 -0.068, -0.018 
Positivity of STs (B) 0.029 0.044 0.65 101 0.515 -0.058, 0.115 
Time Since Last Act. -0.740 0.032 -22.79 773 <.001 -0.803, -0.676 
Wanting 
Intercept 0.656 0.255 2.57 101 0.012 0.150, 1.162 
Frequency of STs (W) 0.133 0.025 5.27 875 <.001 0.084, 0.183 
Frequency of STs (B) 0.030 0.022 1.37 101 0.174 -0.014, 0.074 
Autonomy of Behavior 0.539 0.028 19.55 875 <.001 0.485, 0.593 
Frequency of Activity 0.186 0.041 4.60 875 <.001 0.107, 0.266 
Frequency 
of STs 
Intercept 3.475 0.357 9.74 100 <.001 2.767, 4.183 
Positive Emotion (W) 0.592 0.113 5.26 861 <.001 0.371, 0.813 
Positive Emotion (B) 0.503 0.355 1.42 100 0.160 -0.201, 1.207 
Negative Emotion (W) 0.172 0.115 1.50 861 0.134 -0.053, 0.398 
Negative Emotion (B) 0.185 0.246 0.75 100 0.453 -0.303, 0.673 
Wanting 
Intercept 1.032 0.274 3.76 100 <.001 0.487, 1.576 
Negativity of STs (W) -0.285 0.037 -7.64 723 <.001 -0.358, -0.212 
Negativity of STs (B) -0.015 0.047 -0.31 100 0.757 -0.109, 0.079 
Autonomy of Behavior 0.456 0.030 14.98 723 <.001 0.396, 0.516 
Frequency of Activity 0.201 0.042 4.79 723 <.001 0.118, 0.283 
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Wanting 
Intercept 1.710 0.361 6.55 99 <.001 1.192, 2.228 
Positivity of STs (W) 0.317 0.036 8.78 717 <.001 0.246, 0.387 
Positivity of STs (B) 0.221 0.053 4.15 88 <.001 0.116, 0.327 
Negativity of STs (W) -0.070 0.035 -1.97 717 0.049 -0.138, -0.001 
Negativity of STs (B) 0.038 0.045 0.83 99 0.407 -0.052, 0.127 
Autonomy of Behavior 0.369 0.030 12.43 717 <.001 0.310, 0.427 
Frequency of Activity 0.156 0.039 3.99 717 <.001 0.079, 0.232 
Note: All models include random intercepts and random slopes for the within-person effects (W). However, the random slope for the 
within-person effect of negative emotion on frequency of spontaneous thoughts was omitted because the model failed to converge 
when it was included. Between-person effects are denoted (B).   
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Table 4 
Study 2 Descriptive Statistics 
 Funny Condition  Mixed Condition 
Variable N Mean SD  N Mean SD 
Cartoon Ratings 50 1318.59 198.20  49 1163.42 157.63 
ST Frequency 50 0.270 0.256  46 0.240 0.250 
ST Positivity 36 3.644 0.844  31 2.712 1.141 
Indifference (0) 38 14.868 13.177  41 9.659 12.360 
Indifference (15) 40 28.000 12.341  42 21.429 8.923 
Font Estimate 50 0.920 1.291  49 0.755 1.331 
Note: Cartoon ratings were measured in pixels because a visual analog scale spanning the width 
of the computer screen was used to record responses. ST Frequency corresponds to ratios of 
number of spontaneous thoughts about cartoons relative to total number of spontaneous thoughts 
reported during the thought-listing task; ST Positivity refers to the mean positivity scores of 
spontaneous thoughts about the cartoons. Indifference (0) and Indifference (15) refer to the 
indifference points when the unfunny deck was anchored at the value in parentheses. Font 
Estimate is computed as the difference between participants’ estimates of the size of the font in 
which the word “cartoon” was displayed and the actual size of the font, so a score of zero would 
indicate perfect accuracy, and positive values indicate a tendency to overestimate the size of the 
word cartoon. 
  
     
Table 5 
Study 3 Analyses Concerning Meditation 
Outcome Effects  Estimate SE   t     df p     95% CI 
Positive Emotions 
(T+1) 
Intercept 0.477 0.054 8.82 210 <.001 0.370, 0.583 
Positive Emotions (T) 0.824 0.020 42.16 545 <.001 0.786, 0.862 
Condition -0.025 0.034 -0.74 210 0.461 -0.091, 0.041 
Positive Emotions 
Intercept 2.449 0.082 29.96 212 <.001 2.288, 2.611 
Condition -0.091 0.108 -0.84 212 0.400 -0.304, 0.122 
Positivity  
of STs (T+1) 
Intercept 5.790 0.344 16.81 184 <.001 5.110, 6.469 
Positivity of STs (T) 0.279 0.038 7.31 347 <.001 0.204, 0.354 
Condition 0.065 0.202 0.32 184 0.748 -0.333, 0.463 
Positivity  
of STs 
Intercept 7.977 0.181 44.02 204 <.001 7.620, 8.335 
Condition -0.196 0.250 -0.78 204 0.434 -0.689, 0.297 
Frequency of 
Meditation (T+1) 
Intercept 0.532 0.027 19.88 215 <.001 0.480, 0.585 
Frequency of Med. (T) 0.184 0.030 6.19 632 <.001 0.126, 0.243 
Condition 0.042 0.030 1.43 215 0.154 -0.016, 0.101 
Frequency of 
Meditation 
Intercept 0.559 0.020 27.89 215 <.001 0.520, 0.599 
Condition 0.033 0.029 1.13 215 0.261 -0.025, 0.091 
Frequency  
of STs (T+1) 
Intercept 2.441 0.186 13.14 185 <.001 2.075, 2.807 
Frequency of STs (T) 0.098 0.034 2.84 342 0.005 0.030, 0.165 
Positive Emotions (T) 0.241 0.069 3.48 342 <.001 0.105, 0.377 
Positivity 
of STs (T+1) 
Intercept 5.002 0.386 12.97 180 <.001 4.241, 5.763 
Positivity of STs (T) 0.214 0.039 5.44 314 <.001 0.136, 0.291 
Positive Emotions (T) 0.579 0.102 5.70 314 <.001 0.379, 0.779 
Frequency of  
Meditation (T+1) 
Intercept 0.564 0.065 8.67 204 <.001 0.436, 0.692 
Frequency of Med. (T) 0.161 0.033 4.83 454 <.001 0.095, 0.226 
Positivity of STs (T) 0.002 0.008 0.30 454 0.764 -0.013, 0.017 
Frequency of 
Meditation (T+1) 
Intercept 0.625 0.040 15.44 206 <.001 0.520, 0.640 
Frequency of Med. (T) 0.192 0.036 5.33 479 <.001 0.271, 0.391 
Frequency of STs (T) -0.021 0.013 -1.65 479 0.100 -0.046, 0.004 
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Table 6  
Study 3 Analyses Concerning Physical Activity  
Outcome Effects  Estimate SE   t     df p     95% CI 
Positive Emotions 
(T+1) 
Intercept 0.190 0.042 4.57 202 <.001 0.108, 0.272 
Positive Emotions (T) 0.937 0.013 72.19 533 <.001 0.911, 0.962 
Condition -0.008 0.026 -0.31 202 0.759 -0.059, 0.043 
Positive Emotions 
Intercept 2.666 0.089 30.07 210 <.001 2.491, 2.841 
Condition -0.234 0.122 -1.91 210 0.057 -0.475, 0.007 
Positivity  
of STs (T+1) 
Intercept 2.694 0.227 11.89 186 <.001 2.247, 3.141 
Positivity of STs (T) 0.685 0.027 25.50 364 <.001 0.632, 0.738 
Condition -0.079 0.120 -0.65 186 0.514 -0.316, 0.158 
Positivity  
of STs 
Intercept 7.609 0.217 35.01 204 <.001 7.180, 8.037 
Condition -0.088 0.298 -0.30 204 0.767 -0.675, 0.499 
Frequency of  
PA (T+1) 
Intercept 0.523 0.054 9.62 215 <.001 0.416, 0.630 
Frequency of PA (T) 0.391 0.038 10.18 609 <.001 0.316, 0.467 
Condition 0.068 0.066 1.04 215 0.300 -0.062, 0.198 
Frequency of 
Physical Activity 
Intercept 0.889 0.056 15.86 215 <.001 0.779, 1.000 
Condition 0.025 0.084 0.30 215 0.762 -0.140, 0.191 
Frequency  
of STs (T+1) 
Intercept 0.527 0.124 4.25 188 <.001 0.282, 0.771 
Frequency of STs (T) 0.801 0.025 31.53 347 <.001 0.751, 0.851 
Positive Emotions (T) 0.046 0.039 1.17 347 0.242 -0.031, 0.122 
Positivity 
of STs (T+1) 
Intercept 2.753 0.276 9.97 184 <.001 2.208, 3.298 
Positivity of STs (T) 0.600 0.032 16.52 339 <.001 0.536, 0.664 
Positive Emotions (T) 0.218 0.080 2.71 339 0.007 0.060, 0.377 
Frequency of  
PA (T+1) 
Intercept 0.331 0.128 2.59 204 0.010 0.079, 0.582 
Frequency of PA (T) 0.408 0.043 9.57 472 <.001 0.324, 0.492 
Positivity of STs (T) 0.031 0.016 1.99 472 0.047 0.001, 0.062 
Frequency of PA 
(T+1) 
Intercept 0.090 0.082 1.11 205 0.269 -0.070, 0.251 
Frequency of PA (T) 0.389 0.029 10.07 478 <.001 0.313, 0.465 
Frequency of STs (T) 0.151 0.030 5.00 478 <.001 0.092, 0.210 
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Duration of Cardio 
(T+1) 
Intercept 4.404 2.521 1.75 204 0.082 -0.568, 9.375 
Duration of Cardio (T) 0.715 0.026 27.38 472 <.001 0.664, 0.766 
Positivity of STs (T) 0.721 0.331 2.18 472 0.030 0.070, 1.372 
Duration of Cardio 
(T+1) 
Intercept  7.408 2.391 3.10 204 0.002 2.694, 12.121 
Duration of Cardio (T) 0.633 0.029 21.56 478 <.001 0.576, 0.691 
Frequency of STs (T) 1.538 0.739 2.08 478 0.038 0.086, 2.989 
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Table 7 
Chapter 3 Descriptive Statistics 
 Control Feedback 
Variable Mean SD Mean SD 
Wanting (pre-test) 5.541 2.129 5.314 2.246 
Wanting (post-test) 4.553 2.787 4.583 2.989 
Intended Events 3.079 3.395 4.250 5.940 
Intended Hours 1.568 2.270 2.389 2.834 
Note: Responses on the wanting measure ranged from 0 to 10, with higher scores indicating 
greater wanting.  
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APPENDIX: THOUGHT PROFILE FROM CHAPTER 3 
Our computer program has now processed the data we recorded earlier regarding your 
physiological activity and has integrated these data with the information you provided about your 
thoughts. Together with your survey responses, your patterns of facial and cardiovascular 
activation allow us to determine (with 95% confidence) how positive or negative your 
spontaneous thoughts about [activity] generally are. 
Your data suggest that your spontaneous thoughts are generally quite positive, averaging 
approximately 88% positive. 
 
Note that this estimation pertains only to your spontaneous thoughts, that is, those thoughts that 
seem to pop into your head, even if you don't notice them very often. The state-of-the-science 
does not yet allow us to determine this kind of information about your deliberate thoughts. 
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